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The descriptive theory of cooperative game with incomplete infor-
mation developed to date is surveyed. The theory has the potential to
provide game-theoretical foundations of economic analysis of the free
societies in which organizations (coalitions) as corporations institute
a non-market resource allocation mechanism while using the market
resource allocation mechanism at the same time. The present-day
corporations are interdependent, so the required game theory needs
to model an environment in which the feasibility and implications of
coordinated strategy choice within a coalition are inﬂuenced by the
outsiders’ strategy choice.
The ﬁrst part of the paper provides the key ingredients. After
formulating the basic one-shot model, which synthesizes Harsanyi’s
Bayesian game and Aumann and Peleg’s non-side-payment game (NTU
game), and illustrating economic examples, two required conditions
on an endogenously determined strategy are discussed: measurabil-
ity with respect to an information structure, and Bayesian incentive
compatibility. Several descriptive solution concepts that have been
proposed to date are discussed.
The second part addresses six issues studied in the literature: First,
the existence of the descriptive solutions in the general setup. Second,
explanation of information revelation, that is, a process through which
private information turns into public information. Third, deﬁnitions
of eﬃciency. Fourth, comparisons of several core concepts. Fifth, the
existence results speciﬁc only to the Bayesian pure exchange economy,
and revival of the core convergence theorem within the framework of
the Bayesian pure exchange economy. Sixth, another view on coali-
tion formation, speciﬁcally analyses of situations in which coalitional
membership is anonymous.3
1 Introduction
Since the 1970s, we have seen voluminous literature on the analysis of eco-
nomic problems with asymmetric information. Harsanyi’s (1967/68) Bayesian
game and Bayesian equilibrium have served as a conceptual foundation for
these analyses. While the literature provided new insights into the work-
ings of the present-day economy which the traditional neoclassical paradigm
failed to analyze, many works actually postulated a quite restrictive mode
of players’ interaction, that is, the principal-agent relationship (Stackelberg’s
leader-follower relationship), a speciﬁc instance of the noncooperative game.
Parallel to the development of Bayesian analyses of the noncooperative
game, there has been development in static descriptive cooperative game
theory, the theory which analyzes another interactive mode in which sev-
eral players, with all their diverse (most likely conﬂicting) interests, come
to form a coalition to make a coordinated choice of strategies, because by
doing so everybody in the coalition ends up better oﬀ than behaving alone
(noncooperatively). Aumann and Peleg’s (1960) model of non-side-payment
game (NTU game) and Scarf’s core nonemptiness theorem for this game
(see, e.g., Scarf (1973, theorem 8.3.6, p. 211)) serve as a breakthrough in the
literature. It was with this model that economists could start analyzing coop-
erative behavior without imposing problematic conditions on utilities, such
as the cardinal nature or the transferability. Scarf’s theorem is a milestone
in studies of the core, a central descriptive cooperative solution.
Wilson (1978) pioneered the study of cooperative behavior in the pure
exchange economy with asymmetric information. During the 1990s, there
has been a growing literature on the cooperative game with asymmetric in-
formation.
The purpose of this paper is to survey the new strand of cooperative ex-
tensions of the Bayesian game. This strand of research is far from complete;
on the contrary, there are many unsolved questions, and in fact up to now
there has not been any deﬁnitive general work – hence the title of our paper.
Nevertheless, we decided to take on this task (i.e., to survey the cooperative
game theory with asymmetric information), because this game-theoretical
area is likely to advance economic theory in a fundamental way. The area
is indispensable, for example, in the analysis of an economy with organiza-
tions as production units, in particular in the analysis of resource allocation
mechanisms instituted in organizations as superior alternatives to the mar-4
ket mechanism. Firms (organizations) in the present-day free societies are
interdependent, so we emphasize a general game-theoretical model in which
the feasibility and implications of coordinated strategy choice within a coali-
tion are inﬂuenced by the outsiders’ strategy choice. Another reason for this
survey is to clarify the nature of the various approaches proposed to date.
While the conventional noncooperative Bayesian analyses sometimes have
assumed the presence of a mediator for the ﬁrm activities, there is no need
for a mediator in the cooperative Bayesian analysis. Indeed, in reality, cor-
porations are operated without consulting with a mediator; the managers at
various levels of corporate hierarchy are not mediators but players in a coali-
tion pursuing their own interests. While the principal-agent theory explains
institution of a mechanism as a solution to the mediator’s optimization prob-
lem, cooperative Bayesian analysis explains it as an endogenously determined
strategy bundle chosen by the insiders of the coalition.
The ﬁrst part of the paper provides the key ingredients, such as the basic
one-shot model, the two conditions that an endogenously determined strategy
is required to satisfy, and several descriptive solution concepts. The second
part reviews several issues that the literature has addressed to date. As is the
case with the past major advances in economic theory, the area is expected
to develop in fundamentally new directions, as researchers open up further
new inciting issues.
2 Basic Ingredients
This section presents the basic model (subsection 2.1), several examples (sub-
section 2.2), meaningful conditions that endogenous variables (strategies) are
required to satisfy (subsections 2.3-2.4), and several descriptive solution con-
cepts (subsection 2.5).
2.1 One-shot model
We will ﬁrst present a cooperative extension of Harsanyi’s (1967/1968) Bayes-
ian game. For full analyses of cooperative behavior, the required model needs
to treat at least the strategy concept and coalitional attainability concept
explicitly, so that it embodies both the ingredients of the Bayesian game and
the ingredients of Aumann and Peleg’s (1960) non-side-payment game (NTU5
game).
Let N be a ﬁnite set of players. The family of nonempty coalitions
(nonempty subsets of N) is denoted by N. Each player j has a choice set (an
action set) Cj,atype set T j, and a type-proﬁle dependent von Neumann-
Morgenstern utility function uj. At a particular stage of the game player j
alone knows which member of the set T j is truly realized; in this sense the
realized member tj is called j’s private information. The type set T j will be
assumed to be ﬁnite throughout this paper.
For S ∈N, deﬁne CS :=
 
j∈S Cj, T S :=
 
j∈S T j, and write C := CN,
T := T N for simplicity. A member of T is called a type proﬁle. Generic
elements of sets CS, T S, C and T are denoted by cS (:= (cj)j∈S), tS, c and
t, respectively.
The utility function uj : C × T → R associates j’s utility level uj(c,t)
to each choice bundle c and type proﬁle t.
The ex ante period is deﬁned as the period in which each player does
not have his private information, but has an ex ante probability on the type
proﬁles T, subjective or objective. An interim period (or rather, an in mediis
period) is deﬁned as a period in which each player already has his private
information but does not know the true type proﬁle. Sometimes the interim
period is more speciﬁcally deﬁned as the period in which each player has
only his private information and nothing more; in the following, whenever
confusion is likely, we will clarify the meaning of the term “interim”. The ex
post period is deﬁned as the period in which everybody knows the true type
proﬁle.
Given private information tj, player j holds his subject probability πj(·|
tj) on the others’ type proﬁles T N\{j}. Sometimes we assume that it is derived
from an ex ante probability πj on T by the Bayes rule, πj(tN\{j} | tj)=
πj(tN\{j},t j)/πj(T N\{j}×{tj}). Some works have an ex ante probability as a
given datum, while others have the more general approach in which interim
probabilities are given data.








The set T S gives rise to the partition of T: {{tS}×T N\S | tS ∈ T S}.6
Denote by T S the algebra on T generated by this partition, and set T j :=
T {j}. We call T j player j’s private information structure.
For analysis of cooperative behavior, one ﬁrst needs to distinguish be-
tween feasible and non-feasible coalitional choices. When the players’ true
type proﬁle is given as t, each coalition S has a set of feasible joint choices,
deﬁned as subset CS





the feasible-choice correspondence CS
0 : T → CS is deﬁned for every coalition





0(t), and that CS
0(t)  = CS
0(t )
if t  = t .
Complete information is deﬁned as the situation in which there is no
informational problem, i.e., each set T j is a singleton. In this case we suppress
the notation t from uj(c,t) and CS
0(t), and simply write uj(c) and CS
0 . If,
furthermore, player j’s utility function depends only upon his choice (i.e.,
uj(c)=uj(cj)), then the set




0 : ∀ j ∈ S : uj ≤ u
j(c
j)}
is the set of all utility allocations attainable in coalition S. By coordinated
choice, the members of coalition S can realize any utility allocation in ˜ V (S).
For diﬀerent coalitions S and T, sets ˜ V (S) and ˜ V (T) lie in diﬀerent Euclidean
spaces, so it is analytically convenient to introduce the cylinders in the same
space RN based on ˜ V (S) and ˜ V (T). Deﬁne, therefore,
V (S): ={u ∈ R
N | (uj)j∈S ∈ ˜ V (S)}.
DEFINITION 2.1.2 (Aumann and Peleg, 1960) A non-side-payment
game is a cylinder-valued correspondence from N to RN, i.e., a correspon-
dence V : N→RN such that
[u,v ∈ R
N, ∀ j ∈ S : uj = vj]= ⇒ [u ∈ V (S)i ﬀv ∈ V (S)].
A strategy of a player speciﬁes his choice contingent upon a type proﬁle.
Formally, a strategy of player j is a function xj : T → Cj. A choice cj ∈ Cj
may be identiﬁed with the constant strategy t  → cj. Denote by Xj the set
of all logically conceivable strategies of player j,
X
j := {x
j : T → C
j}.
For coalition S, deﬁne XS :=
 
j∈S Xj; it is the set of all logically conceivable
coordinated strategies. Write X := XN for simplicity. The model under7
construction explains which strategy bundle xS := (xj)j∈S is agreed upon by
the members of coalition S.
We next introduce the feasible-strategy concept. Suppose the grand coali-
tion is entertaining possible strategy bundle ¯ x ∈ X. If coalition S is to devi-
ate from N in this situation, the members of S have to know which strategy
bundles xS are feasible for them. The a priori given set F S(¯ x)( ⊂ XS) de-
scribes precisely these feasible strategies. Feasibility is thus formulated by
a feasible-strategy correspondence F S : X → XS, which associates to each
strategy bundle ¯ x ∈ X (which may not be feasible) the set F S(¯ x) of all fea-
sible strategy bundles available to coalition S. A feasible strategy bundle as
a function xS : T → CS cannot depend on the outsiders’ types tN\S, since
the members of S do not know them. So the strategy bundle xS depends
only upon their own types tS, that is, it is T S-measurable. Here, the corre-
spondence F S : X → XS is interpreted as the basic feasibility determined by
resource constraints and the characteristics of individual players. The T S-
measurability should not be interpreted as an informational restriction; the
latter will be discussed later. Indeed, we will see in subsections 2.3 and 3.2
stronger measurability requirements reﬂecting information available to each
member.




0 (¯ x): ={x
S ∈ X
S | x
S is a T
S-measurable selection of C
S
0}
as the feasible-strategy correspondence. We take another approach, however,
in which the correspondence F S is arbitrarily given provided
∀ ¯ x ∈ X : F
S(¯ x) ⊂{ x
S ∈ X
S | x
S is a T
S-measurable selection of C
S
0}.
This allows us to take into account the possibility that coalition S’s feasibility
is inﬂuenced by the outsiders’ strategy choice.1
Majority of the works done to date are on ex ante endogenous determina-
tion of a strategy bundle,2 so we consider the situation in which each player
1 There is redundancy in deﬁnitions of CS
0 and FS; once we have the feasible-
strategy correspondence concept, we can consistently deﬁne a feasible-choice correspon-
dence concept.
2 One of the major goals of this research area is more ambitious: to explain interim
endogenous determination of a strategy bundle. Since no general result has been success-
fully established yet in order to achieve this goal, we chose the title of the present survey
paper as it is now.8
has an ex ante probability on T. For simplicity, we also assume that this is
a strictly positive objective probability π.
DEFINITION 2.1.3 (Ichiishi and Idzik, 1996) A Bayesian society is











of: (i) a ﬁnite set of players N; (ii) a choice set Cj, a ﬁnite set of types T j, and
a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function uj : C ×T → R for each player
j; (ii) a feasible-choice correspondence CS
0 : T → CS, and a feasible-strategy
correspondence F S : X → XS for each coalition S, such that each element
of F S(¯ x)i saT S-measurable selection of CS
0; and (iii) a strictly positive ex
ante objective probability π on T.
Wilson (1978) pioneered study of the core of a pure exchange economy
with incomplete information. He introduced and carefully discussed several
core concepts that would allow for the phenomenon of adverse selection.
We recall that adverse selection undermines opportunities for insurance in
a market, as Akerlof (1970) demonstrated in his model of the market for
lemons. Wilson emphasized the role of revelation of private information.
When player j is endowed only with his private information structure, he
can distinguish two states (i.e., two type proﬁles), t and t , iﬀ there exists
an event E ∈T j such that t ∈ E and t   ∈ E. Likewise, when coalition
S is formed and each member somehow fully reveals his information to his
colleagues, any member of S can distinguish two states using the pooled
information structure T S. In general, each member j receives only partial
information from his colleagues, so the information structure he can use is
an algebra Aj which is ﬁner than his private information structure but is
coarser than the fully pooled information structure.
DEFINITION 2.1.4 (Wilson, 1978) A communication system for coali-
tion S is an #S-tuple of algebras {Aj}j∈S on T such that




It is called null,i fAj = T j for every j ∈ S. It is called full,i fAj = T S for
every j ∈ S.9
We have followed Harsanyi (1967/1968) in formulating information struc-
tures as algebras on the type proﬁle space T. A type proﬁle is a state of the
nature. Actually, Wilson (1978) and many subsequent authors took a more
general approach in which an arbitrary probability space (Ω,T ,π) is given
to describe the possible states of the nature, and an arbitrary subalgebra T j
of T is also given to describe player j’s private information structure, j ∈ N.
Harsanyi’s type-proﬁle framework (Ω =
 
j∈N T j) treats the case of extreme
asymmetry of information that private information structures T i and T j are
uncorrelated for diﬀerent players i and j (T i ∩Tj = {∅,T} if i  = j), but
Wilson’s general approach allows for correlation, that is, T i ∩Tj may con-
tain nonempty proper subsets of Ω. For the expository purpose, however, we
adopt the type-proﬁle framework in most parts of this paper.
2.2 Examples
We present several economic examples of the Bayesian society (deﬁnition
2.1.3).










is an economy with l commodities, where N is a ﬁnite set of consumers, and
for each consumer j, Rl
+ is his consumption set, T j is his ﬁnite type set,
uj : Rl
+ × T → R is his type-proﬁle dependent von Neumann-Morgenstern
utility function, ej : T j → Rl
+ is his initial endowment vector, which depends
only upon tj, and π is an ex ante objective probability on T.
The associated Bayesian society ({Cj,Tj,u j}j∈N, {CS
0,FS}S∈N,π ) is de-
ﬁned as follows. The ingredients, N, T j and π, are already given in economy
Epe. Therefore, we only need to deﬁne the choice sets Cj and the feasible-
strategy correspondences F S, so that the deﬁnition of Cj enables us to use














   
 








Thus, the utility function uj of the Bayesian society depends only on player
j’s choice and a type proﬁle. Player j’s strategy here is a T S-measurable
demand plan, xj : T → Rl
+. Some works (e.g., Hahn and Yannelis (1997),
Vohra (1999) and Yazar (2001)) re-formulate the model so that j’s strategy
is a net trade plan, zj : t  → xj(t)−ej(tj). Demand plan xj is T S-measurable
iﬀ net trade plan zj is T S-measurable. Choice of demand plan versus net
trade plan as a strategy aﬀects some results (see proposition 2.4.3, lemma
3.5.1 and theorem 3.5.3).
￿











is an economy with l commodities, where ({Rl
+,Tj,u j,e j}j∈N,π) represents
the consumption sector Epe, and {Y S}S∈N represents the production sector:
Correspondence Y S : T → Rl associates to each type proﬁle t a production
set Y S(t)( ⊂ Rl) for coalition S.
The associated Bayesian society ({Cj,Tj,u j}j∈N, {CS
0,FS}S∈N,π ) is de-
ﬁned as follows. The ingredients, N, T j and π, are already given in economy
Ecp. Therefore, we only need to deﬁne the choice sets Cj and the feasible-
strategy correspondences F S, so that the deﬁnition of Cj enables us to use
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xS is T S-measurable,
∃ y : T → Rl, T S-measurable,
∀ t ∈ T : y(t) ∈ Y S(t),
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￿
EXAMPLE 2.2.3 As a corporation grows, its internal structure evolves.
One of the major characteristics of the present-day economy is emergence of
ﬁrms in multidivisional form,( M-form ﬁrms in short), corporations in which
several divisions (called proﬁt centers) are operated semiautonomously; see
Chandler (1962) for historical development of the M-form ﬁrms.
Each division in an M-form ﬁrm is, to a signiﬁcant extent, an indepen-
dent decision-maker. As an organization itself, it has its own organizational11
decision-making. Even if we abstract away the intraorganizational issues of
a division, we still need to analyze the interorganizational issues among the
divisions: As decision-units of the same corporation, these divisions talk to
each other and coordinate their production activities. Total proﬁt will then
be distributed to the divisions. (The deﬁnition of proﬁt in this example is
diﬀerent from the neoclassical deﬁnition of proﬁt, in that it need not reﬂect
the cost of resources, such as capital, that are not under the control of the
divisions.)
Radner (1992) (1) formulated an interorganizational issue of the divisions
as a static model of proﬁt-center game, (2) viewed the core of the game as the
equilibrium outcomes, and (3) studied its properties for several interesting
cases. One of the key ingredients in Radner’s formulation of an M-form ﬁrm is
the distinction of marketed commodities and nonmarketed commodities; while
a commodity in the former category has a price established in the market
outside the ﬁrm, a commodity in the latter category has no price and is used
only internally. An intermediate nonmarketed commodity is a commodity, not
available in the market, which is supplied as an output by a division of the
ﬁrm and is demanded as an input by another division.3 A central resource
allocation problem in an M-form ﬁrm then arises: A nonmarketed commodity
produced or initially held by a division (say, division i) is transferred to
another division (say, division j), and the two divisions have to come up
with a mutually agreeable level of payment that j has to make to i in return
for the use of the commodity. This problem, customarily called a transfer
payment problem, addresses determination of prices according to a nonmarket
mechanism.
We present Ichiishi and Radner’s (1999) model, which introduces asym-
metric information to Radner’s (1992) model. It may be considered a partic-
ular instance of the Bayesian coalition production economy (example 2.2.2),
but due to its focus on an information-revelation process, it has a richer
structure. We will present the added structure in subsection 3.2.1. For now,
we only mention that the proﬁt center game with incomplete information is
3 A division of an M-form ﬁrm, for example, produces computers and sells them in the
market. The ﬁrm’s product, computers, is a marketed commodity. For its production, the
division needs as inputs computer chips that are produced in another division of the same
ﬁrm. This chip, designed only for production of the computer, is useless for any other
purpose, in particular outside the ﬁrm, so it is an intermediate nonmarketed commodity.12









and a price vector of the market commodities p ∈ R
km
+ , where km is the num-
ber of the marketed commodities and kn is the number of the nonmarketed
commodities, and for each division j, the input-output space Rkm+kn is its
choice set, T j is the set of possible types, rj : T → Rkn is the resource func-
tion (initial endowment vector of nonmarketed commodities), π is an ex ante
objective probability on T, and Y j(·) is the production set. Each division is
risk-neutral.
￿
2.3 Measurability as feasibility of individual actions
This subsection and next subsection present two economically meaningful
conditions that the strategies of a Bayesian society (deﬁnition 2.1.3) have to
satisfy in the presence of diﬀerential information: measurability with respect
to the available information structure, and Bayesian incentive compatibility.
We ﬁrst discuss the issue of measurability.
Suppose that the grand coalition is entertaining a strategy bundle ¯ x, but
that the members of coalition S are contemplating to defect and to take their
own strategy bundle xS : T → CS, ex ante or interim.
Suppose the members of S know that a communication system {Aj}j∈S
will be available to them at the time of strategy execution, that is, when each
member j will make choice according to his strategy xj.I ft is the true type
proﬁle, denoting by Aj(t) the minimal element of Aj that contains t, player j
will know at the time of action that the event Aj(t) has occurred, but he will
not know which speciﬁc state in the event Aj(t) has actually realized. Since
he cannot distinguish the states in Aj(t), he cannot take diﬀerent actions for
any two states in Aj(t). This means that his strategy xj has to be constant
on Aj(t).4 In other words, his strategy has to be Aj-measurable.
4 A conference on economic theory is held at a respectable university on the outskirts of
Istanbul, Turkey, and many theorists from the world over participate in it. One day during
the conference, all the American participants have disappeared from the conference site.
The rest of the conference participants are told that the Americans are in the old town
of Istanbul, enjoying sightseeing. The precise whereabouts of the American group is the
Americans’ private information and this information has not been made public; they may13
Within the general equilibrium framework, Radner (1968) proposed the
measurability condition with respect to an available information structure as
a feasibility requirement on individual actions. By adopting this feasibility
condition for a coalitional framework, we obtain the following condition.
CONDITION 2.3.1 (Radner, 1968) Suppose that the grand coalition
is entertaining a strategy bundle ¯ x, but that the members of coalition S are
contemplating to defect and to take their own strategy bundle. Suppose the
members of S know that a communication system {Aj}j∈S will be available
to them at the time of strategy execution. They can take only those strategies
xS ∈ F S(¯ x) such that xj is Aj-measurable for every j ∈ S.
The private information case is deﬁned as the situation in which when the
members execute a strategy bundle, member j has only his private informa-
tion structure T j, so knows only his true type tj and the interim probability
πj(·|tj) on the others’ types. In this case the above measurability condition
becomes the private measurability condition in that each player j’s strategy
be T j-measurable. Notice that function xj : T → Cj is T j-measurable iﬀ
it is a function only of tj. We may, therefore, safely write xj(tj) (instead
of xj(t)) in the private information case. Yannelis (1991) re-emphasized the
signiﬁcance of the measurability condition by introducing the private mea-
surability to the core analysis of the Bayesian pure exchange economy. For
the private information case, deﬁne the correspondences F  S : X → CS by
F
 S(¯ x): ={x
S ∈ F
S(¯ x) |∀j ∈ S : x
j is T j-measurable.}.
The fully pooled information case is deﬁned as the situation in which
when the members execute the strategy bundle xS, every member j has the
pooled information structure T S. As soon as we go beyond the private in-
formation case, it is highly desirable to explain how agents come to pool or
be at Topkapi or at the Blue Mosque. A Japanese participant, not knowing how to enjoy
life, stays at the conference; he wants to have coﬀee or tea during the session break. He
cannot make his choice of coﬀee versus tea contingent upon the American group’s location
as he does not know it; it is impossible for him, for example, to choose to drink coﬀee
based on the fact that the Americans are visiting Topkapi and to choose tea based on
the fact that they are visiting the Blue Mosque. He can plan to drink coﬀee regardless
whether the Americans are at Topkapi or at the Blue Mosque, or can plan to drink tea
regardless whether the Americans are at Topkapi or at the Blue Mosque.14
share their private information. This issue will be picked up in subsections
2.4 and 3.2. Some authors (see, e.g., Vohra (1999) or Forges, Minelli, and
Vohra (2000)) emphasize that the private measurability requirement is too
stringent as a feasibility condition. However, we would like to note, as was
done by Radner (1968), that the measurability with respect to the informa-
tion structure of an individual at the time of his action is a fundamental
feasibility requirement. Of course, this measurability requirement need not
be the private measurability. But as we just remarked, if the measurability
requirement is to take account of information revealed by other players, it is
highly desirable to model information revelation explicitly as in the rational
expectations model (Radner(1979)). Without such an explicit modeling of
information revelation, the private measurability requirement seems highly
plausible.
2.4 Bayesian incentive compatibility as feasibility of
execution of contracts
The next feasibility condition pertains to the feasibility of execution of strat-
egy bundles viewed as “contracts” made within a coalition. In order for a
strategy bundle to be agreed upon by the players, each player must feel cer-
tain that the strategy bundle will be executed in exact accordance with its
terms. This feasibility condition is formulated as the Bayesian incentive com-
patibility. We start discussions of this condition for the private information
case in subsection 2.4.1. We will discuss the same condition, modiﬁed for the
other cases, in subsections 2.4.2 and 2.4.3.
2.4.1 Private information case
To execute a T j-measurable strategy xj : T j → Cj, player j of type ¯ tj
needs to take action xj(¯ tj). We sometimes say throughout the present paper,
“player j represents or poses as type ¯ tj” In the traditional terminology of the
mechanism theory, “player j reports his type ¯ tj.” Unlike most of the non-
cooperative theory, however, the present cooperative theory does not suppose
the existence of a mediator who would receive reports from the players; in fact
no player needs to report his type to any other players or third person who is
outside the game. What we mean by this statement is that he simply makes
the choice cj := xj(¯ tj) ∈ Cj. The other players may observe the action cj,15
but does not have to be told about the type ¯ tj. This interpretation is par-
ticularly important when the function xj is not 1-1 (i.e., when xj is not fully
information-revealing), since j’s action cj does not provide the information
to his colleagues as to which of the types (xj)
−1 (cj) is his true type. In the
private information case of the one-shot game, player j can make any choice
from the range of function xj and can avoid being caught.
The members of a coalition agree on a strategy bundle, in order to plan a
best choice bundle preparing for every contingency. It is essential, therefore,
that choices are later made as scheduled. But the private information case
in particular creates the incentive for players to misrepresent their true types
after a strategy is chosen, which would prevent realization of the planned re-
sult, thereby failing to fulﬁll the purpose of coalition formation. If members
of coalition S foresee at the outset that a particular strategy bundle may later
induce such misrepresentation, they will not agree to such a bundle. There-
fore, the feasible-strategy set is further restricted to those strategies that are
Bayesian incentive-compatible in the sense of d’Aspremont and G´ erard-Varet
(1979). We elaborate on this idea in this section.
Suppose that the grand coalition is entertaining a strategy bundle ¯ x, but
that the members of coalition S are contemplating to defect and to take their
own strategy bundle xS : T → CS after defection. Let j be any member of
S, whose true type is ¯ tj. If he makes a choice according to the agreement,























 N\{j} | ¯ t
j).
If on the other hand he makes choice cj ∈ xj(T j) \{ xj(¯ tj)} contrary to the























 N\{j} | ¯ t
j).
His colleagues S\{j} cannot catch this betraying act in the private informa-
tion case, being led to believe that j’s true type were in the event (xj)
−1 (cj).
5 Recall the present emphasis that players take actions (make choices) rather than make
reports; in fact they do not have to report their types to anybody.16
In the present context, the Bayesian incentive compatibility says that strat-
egy bundle xS is designed so that nobody has the incentive to act contrary
to the promised strategy bundle xS.
CONDITION 2.4.1 (d’Aspremont and G´ erard-Varet, 1979) Sup-
pose that the grand coalition is entertaining a strategy bundle ¯ x, but that
the members of coalition S are contemplating to defect and to take their own
strategy bundle after defection. In the private information case, members of
S agree only on those strategies xS ∈ F  S(¯ x) that are Bayesian incentive-
compatible, that is,
∀ j ∈ S : ∀ ¯ t
j ∈ T












N\S | ¯ t
j).
In accordance with d’Aspremont and G´ erard-Varet’s original formulation,
Bayesian incentive compatibility can also be stated as follows: After the
members of coalition S have agreed on a strategy bundle xS ∈ F S(¯ x), they


















where the expectation is taken with respect to the outsiders’ type proﬁles
tN\S (see deﬁnition 2.1.1). Here, player j’s choice space is his type space T j,
so that his strategy is a pretension function σj : T j → T j, specifying for each
possible true type ¯ tj his reported type σj(¯ tj). The members of S are assuming
that the outsiders N \ S do not pretend but truthfully execute the strategy
bundle ¯ xN\S. When the true type proﬁle of S is ¯ tS, each member j’s utility
level is the conditional expected utility Euj((xi(σi(·)))i∈S, ¯ xN\S(·) | ¯ tS)) given
¯ tS. Of course, at the time of playing this Bayesian game, each player j ∈ S
has only his private information, ¯ tj.A Bayesian equilibrium is a strategy
bundle σ∗S such that for any possible true type proﬁle ¯ tS, the choice bundle
σ∗S(¯ tS) is a Nash equilibrium:
∀ ¯ t













N\S) | ¯ t
j),17
where xj(tj) is the constant function, t j  → xj(tj). Bayesian incentive com-
patibility says that the identity function from T S to T S is a Bayesian equi-
librium. Thus, player j ﬁnds it to his advantage to make an honest report
assuming that the others N \{ j} are also making honest reports.
Bayesian incentive compatibility had been used in Myerson’s (1984) study
of the λ-transfer value in the context of incomplete information. Ichiishi and
Idzik (1996) introduced Bayesian incentive compatibility to the Bayesian core
analysis (or more generally, to the Bayesian strong equilibrium analysis).6





 S(¯ x) | x
S is Bayesian incentive-compatible.}.
In many interesting private information case, members of the set ˆ F S(¯ x) are
abundant; any constant function, for example, is a member of ˆ F S(¯ x) provided
it is a member of F S(¯ x).
A strategy bundle xS is called strictly Bayesian incentive-compatible rel-
ative to the grand coalition’s strategy bundle ¯ x, if the Bayesian incentive
compatibility condition, expressed by the weak inequalities, is satisﬁed with
strict inequalities, i.e.,
∀ j ∈ S :( ∀ ¯ t
j,˜ t
j ∈ T
j : ¯ t











N\S | ¯ t
j).
A suﬃcient condition for the existence of a strictly Bayesian incentive-compat-
ible strategy bundle can be found in social choice theory:
LEMMA 2.4.2 (Abreu and Matsushima, 1992) Let ({Cj,Tj,u j}j∈N,
{CS
0,FS}S∈N,π ) be a Bayesian society. Assume for each player j ∈ N that
his choice set Cj is convex, his utility function uj is deﬁned on Cj ×T j, and
the function uj(·,t j) is aﬃnely linear on Cj for every tj ∈ T j. Assume also
that there exists a ﬁnite subset C
j
f of Cj such that
(∀ t
j,t
 j ∈ T
j : t
j  = t
 j):∃ c
j,c
















6 The ﬁrst draft of Ichiishi and Idzik (1996) had been circulated since the summer of
1991.18
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The dependence of j’s utility function uj only on j’s own choice and type
in lemma 2.4.2 may be called the no-externality case, but the other players
still inﬂuence j through the feasible-strategy correspondences, F S, S   j.F o r
application of the above lemma to strict Bayesian incentive compatibility, it
suﬃces to notice that Euj(x | tj)=uj(xj(tj),t j) in the present no-externality
case.
Hahn and Yannelis (1997) noted that for the Bayesian pure exchange
economy in the private information case, the private measurability condition
(condition 2.3.1 for the null communication system) implies the Bayesian
incentive compatibility condition (condition 2.4.1), provided that the con-
sumers’ strategies are net trade plans:
PROPOSITION 2.4.3 (Hahn and Yannelis, 1997) Let Epe be the
Bayesian pure exchange economy in the private information case, in which
each player j’s strategy is his net trade plan and the coalitional feasibility is
deﬁned by the equality of supply and demand within the each coalition. Then
the measurability condition implies the Bayesian incentive compatibility con-
dition.
Proof Let zS : T S → Rl·#S be a feasible strategy bundle of coalition S
which satisﬁes the measurability condition. Then, each zj is a function of tj,
and









Let ¯ tS be the true type proﬁle, and choose any consumer j ∈ S and any of
his types ˜ tj. The attainability has to be satisﬁed for the two type proﬁles


































j | ¯ t
j),19
so strategy zj is Bayesian incentive-compatible.
￿
Notice that the feasibility of strategies in this proposition is given by
the equality (of the total demand and the total supply), but the feasibility
in example 2.2.1 is given by the weak inequality. It turns out that under
the weak monotonicity assumption on the preference relations, if some mea-
surable strategy bundle satisﬁes the market clearance condition with weak
inequality, then there is a larger measurable strategy bundle which satisﬁes
the market clearance condition with equality (see lemma 3.2.6).
This proposition is no longer valid if a demand plan is used as a strategy.
Consider, for example, the following economy with one commodity (l = 1):
Consumer j’s type space consists of two elements, T j = {aj,b j}, his utility






1, if tj = aj,
2, if tj = bj.










so strategy ej is not Bayesian incentive-compatible. The proposition is not
valid either in the general model of Bayesian society S
REMARK 2.4.4 Recall the revelation principle, established for the princ-
ipal-agent theory of mechanism design: There is one principal (the Stack-
elberg leader), and a ﬁnite set N of agents who have private information
(the Stackelberg followers). Let Mj be agent j’s message space, and set
M :=
 
j∈N Mj. Let Z be an outcome space. First, the principal designs a
mechanism g : M → Z which speciﬁes an outcome to each message proﬁle,
and oﬀers it to the agents. Each agent then decides to accept or reject it.
If all agents accept it, each agent j sends a message to the principal; he can
condition his message on his private information, so his strategy is a function,
σj : T j → Mj, which means that agent j sends message σj(tj) if his true
type is tj. Denoting by uj : Z × T j → R j’s type-dependent von Neumann-
Morgenstern utility function deﬁned on the outcome space, the agents play
the Bayesian game {Mj,Tj,u j ◦ g,{πj(·|tj)}tj∈Tj}j∈N. A strategy bundle20
σ gives rise to agent j’s interim conditional expected utility Euj(g(σ) | ¯ tj)
given his type ¯ tj:
Eu









A Bayesian equilibrium of this game is a strategy bundle σ∗ such that for all
player j ∈ N and all his possible type tj ∈ T j, his strategy σ∗j gives the best











Now, the revelation principle guarantees that, in designing an optimal mech-
anism, the principal can restrict the set of admissible mechanisms only to
those mechanisms from T to Z (that is, each agent j’s message space is his
type space T j) that satisfy Bayesian incentive compatibility. To be precise,
it says: Let g : M → Z be a mechanism, and let σ∗ be a Bayesian equilibrium
of g. Set z∗
g := g ◦ σ∗, the equilibrium random outcome. Then, there exists
a mechanism g  : T → Z such that the honest-strategy bundle (the identity
function from T to T) is a Bayesian equilibrium of g  and gives rise to z∗
g as
its equilibrium random outcome.
The essential implication of the revelation principle is the computational
convenience for the principal’s designing: The principal may assume with-
out loss of generality that his available mechanisms are Bayesian incentive-
compatible. In the light of this principle, one might conjecture that also in
the Bayesian society the players may choose Bayesian incentive-compatible
strategies without loss of generality. But this is false; by restricting the
feasible-strategy set from F  S(¯ x)t o ˆ F S(¯ x), coalition S loses substantially,
that is, the set of attainable expected utility allocations for S shrinks. By
imposing condition 2.4.1, therefore, we are assuming that coalition S pays
this loss in order to guarantee truthful execution of an agreed-upon strategy
bundle.
To see that the revelation principle does not work here, recall the proof
of the revelation principle in the mechanism design theory. It is extremely
simple: Let σ∗ be a Bayesian equilibrium relative to a given mechanism
g : M → Z. Then, the mechanism g ◦ σ∗ : T → Z is the required Bayesian
incentive-compatible mechanism.
For the present Bayesian game BG(xS, ¯ xN\S) that follows agreement of a
strategy bundle xS ∈ F  S(¯ x), let σ∗S be its Bayesian equilibrium. The prob-
lem is that the function xS◦σ∗S : T → CS, while satisfying the measurability21
and the Bayesian incentive compatibility conditions, may not be a member
of F S(¯ x).
As a counterexample to disprove the revelation principle in the Bayesian
society, consider the example of the Bayesian pure exchange economy with
one commodity given in the paragraph that immediately precedes the present
remark. The initial endowment bundle e is an attainable and private mea-
surable strategy bundle. The Bayesian game BG(e) that follows agreement







The strategy bundle e◦σ∗ is a constant function, ej◦σ∗ : tj  → 2, j ∈ N,s oi s
private measurable and Bayesian incentive compatible, but is not attainable.
￿
So far, we have seen formulations of Bayesian incentive compatibility in
the private information case within the framework of one-shot model. More
generally, Bayesian incentive compatibility reﬂects the information system
available at the time of action (strategy execution). Subsection 3.2.1 and
Appendix present how the deﬁnition is modiﬁed for a particular two-interim-
period model.
2.4.2 Mediator-based approach
Vohra (1999) proposed the mediator-based approach within the framework of
the Bayesian pure exchange economy Epe. There are two possible scenarios
for his approach; we ﬁrst present the one described by Vohra (1999, page
124, the second paragraph). He postulates that there is an enforcement
agency (mediator) for each coalition S, who enforces a coalitionally agreed
upon strategy bundle, a net trade bundle {zj}j∈S, zj : T S → Rl, such that
 
j∈S zj(tS)=0 for every tS ∈ T S. Notice the dependency of zj on T S. When
players’ types are still private information, each player j communicates his
type tj to the mediator, who, having received the reported type proﬁle tS,
enforces each player j to take the promised action zj(tS). The mediator does
not know the true type proﬁle, and this fact could create the possibility of
j’s misrepresenting his type. Suppose ¯ tS is the true type proﬁle. Assuming























N\{j} | ¯ t
j).
On the other hand, assuming also that the others report their true types, j’s























N\{j} | ¯ t
j).
Vohra postulates Bayesian incentive compatibility that misrepresentation is
not worthwhile. Extending his condition to the Bayesian society is straight-
forward.
CONDITION 2.4.5 (Vorha, 1999) Coalition S’s T S-measurable strat-
egy bundle zS in the Bayesian pure exchange economy is Bayesian incentive-
compatible, in the sense that
¬∃j ∈ S : ∃ ¯ t
j ∈ T











j | ¯ t
j).
Although Vohra emphasizes importance of the mediator’s role, in our view
the need for a mediator is a weakness of the model in descriptive cooperative
theory. We provide, therefore, the second scenario for Vohra’s mediator-
based approach now; it attempts to eliminate the mediator from the scene.
We will conclude, however, that this attempt is not completely accomplished,
so that the diﬃculty remains. Stage 1. The members of coalition S agree on
a strategy bundle {zj}j∈S, assuming that their private information will have
been fully pooled by the time of strategy execution, that is, they design each
zj so that it is T S-measurable. Every member j knows the functional form
of his colleague i’s strategy zi. Stage 2. At the time the members’ true types
¯ tj, j ∈ S, are private information, they simultaneously and independently
communicate their types each other. Assuming honest communication of his
colleagues, member j’s best action is honest communication of his true type.
The true type proﬁle ¯ tS is thus transmitted to every member. Stage 3. Each
member j takes the promised action zj(¯ tS).23
There remains one uneasiness about the above scenario: In stage 2, player
j evaluates his possible communication based upon the interim probability
(the conditional probability given ¯ tj). At this time, he has not made his
choice of net trade yet. In stage 3, however, when he is about to make his
choice, he can evaluate his choice based upon the ex post probability (the
conditional probability given ¯ tS),7 and according to this updated probability
his decision in stage 2 may not have been optimal. In case his decision in
stage 2 turns out to be suboptimal, he may refuse to act as promised in stage
3. This point is illustrated in the following simplest example.
EXAMPLE 2.4.6 Consider the Bayesian pure exchange economy with one
commodity (l = 1) and two consumers (N = {1,2}), in which each con-




2}), all type proﬁles have
the equal ex ante probability (π(t)=1 /4), his utility function depends lin-
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This plan satisﬁes attainability and Bayesian incentive compatibility (condi-
tion 2.4.5). Let ¯ t be any true type proﬁle, say ¯ t =( t1
1,t 2
1). Then consumer
1 ends up with the ﬁnal consumption of 0 at stage 3, which is less than his
initial endowment at this state. Consumer 1 will break oﬀ from the grand
coalition, taking back his initial endowment.
￿
The mediator-based approach without a mediator thus postulates a cor-
porate (coalitional) atmosphere which forces its members to always act ac-
cording to an agreed upon strategy bundle. It is this invisible enforcement
atmosphere that we label as the “mediator.” In reality, however, the eﬀec-
tiveness of this kind of mediator is questionable.
7 This is the ex post probability, indeed, since his net trade plan zj is T S-measurable.24
The private information case, together with the associated private mea-
surability condition, postulates the safe attitude of each coalition that it
avoids to design those mechanisms that could make its member reluctant to
act at the time of contract execution.
While the Bayesian incentive compatibility for the private information
case (presented in subsection 2.4.1) or for the information-revelation case
(via contract execution – to be presented in subsection 3.2.1) reﬂects the
information system available at the time of making a choice (action), the
Bayesian incentive compatibility for the mediator-based cases (presented in
subsections 2.4.2, 2.4.3 and 3.2.3) does not.
The Bayesian strategic cooperative game theory, pioneered by Wilson
(1978), and subsequently developed by Yannelis (1991) as he introduced pri-
vate measurability, and by Ichiishi and Idzik (1996) as they introduced the
general framework and Bayesian incentive compatibility, does not rely on
the existence of a mediator. It serves as a theoretical foundation of analy-
ses of the present-day economy, since no mediator, visible or invisible, plays
any role in operating the organizations (corporations) in real life. The re-
cent mediator-based approaches left open the question of how to eliminate a
mediator.
2.4.3 Communication plan as a part of a strategy
Bayesian incentive compatibility takes quite a diﬀerent form when players’
strategies involve more than type-proﬁle dependent choices. In an attempt
to determine Wilson’s communication system (deﬁnition 2.1.4) endogenously
in an equilibrium (core strategy) of the Bayesian pure exchange economy
(example 2.2.1), Yazar (2001) deﬁned player j’s strategy as a pair of a net
trade plan zj : T → Rl and an information substructure Cj. An algebra
Cj on T is called j’s communication plan, if it is coarser than his private
information structure T j; it is an information structure that j provides to his
colleagues as a part of his strategy. When every player i in coalition S chooses
strategy (zi,Ci), the communication system {Aj}j∈S for S is determined as
Aj := T j ∨ (∨i∈SCi). It will turn out that this new deﬁnition of strategy
(zj,Cj) is implicit in the blocking concept used in deﬁning Wilson’s ﬁne core
(deﬁnition 2.5.2).
Yazar’s scenario goes as follows. Suppose that coalition S is formed and
the members choose a strategy bundle {zj,Cj}j∈S. This means in particular25
that the members of the coalition communicate the information conveyed
by Cj among themselves. Thus, everybody in the coalition has at least the
pooled information structure ∨i∈SCi, so each net trade plan zj can be made
∨i∈SCi-measurable.
Let ¯ t := {¯ tj}j∈S be its true type proﬁle. At the beginning of the interim
period, everybody has only his private information structure, so member j
knows that the event E := {¯ tj}×T N\{j} has realized; at this moment, any
state t ∈ E could have occurred from j’s point of view. Then, everybody
passes on information to his colleagues according to the promised communi-
cation plan. Let Ci(ti) × T N\{i} be the minimal element of Ci that contains
t. Member j thinks that if t ∈ E occurs and if everybody sends the true
information, then everybody receives the additional pooled information that
the event
 
i∈S Ci(ti) has realized. Notice that in the light of the measura-
bility requirement, function zj is constant on
 
i∈S Ci(ti), so he can choose
net trade zj(t) no matter which state in
 
i∈S Ci(ti) is true. Consumer j’s





















 N\{j} | ¯ t
j).
Member j can pass on to his colleagues false information C j×T N\{j} ∈C j.
Then, he thinks that if t ∈ E occurs and if everybody else passes on to the
others the true information according to the promised communication plan,
the additional pooled information is that the event E  := C j×
 
i∈S\{j}Ci(ti)
has realized. Function zj(t) is constant on E . Member j’s interim expected
utility will be Euj(zj(E )+ej(¯ tj) | ¯ tj).
Yazar’s condition of Bayesian incentive compatibility says that no mem-
ber of a coalition can beneﬁt from providing false information to the other
members. Extending her condition to the Bayesian society is straightforward.
CONDITION 2.4.7 (Yazar, 2001) Coalition S’s strategy bundle {zj,
Cj}j∈S in the Bayesian pure exchange economy is Bayesian incentive-compat-
ible, in the sense that
¬∃j ∈ S : ∃ ¯ t
j ∈ T
j : ∃ C
  ∈C













j) | ¯ t
j).
where E  := C  ×
 
i∈S\{j} Ci(ti).26
We remark that Yazar’s model without a mediator has the same diﬃculty
as Vohra’s mediator-based approach without a mediator, that is, having col-
lected the others’ private information, some players may not want to act
according to an agreed upon strategy bundle.
We presented Yazar’s Bayesian incentive compatibility condition within
Harsanyi’s (1967/1968) type-proﬁle framework, that is, for the case of ex-
treme asymmetry of information, T i ∩Tj = {∅,T} if i  = j. She actually
adopted Wilson’s (1978) general approach in which state space Ω and player
j’s private information structure T j (an algebra on Ω), j ∈ N, are arbi-
trarily given. Player j’s communication plan Cj is a subalgebra of T j. His
initial endowment ej is a T j-measurable function on Ω. Given such a general
state space and private information structures, Yazar’s original deﬁnition of
Bayesian incentive compatibility is a bit more involved.
Going back to the type-proﬁle framework, we will point out two facts and
argue that Vohra’s (1999) work is a special case of Yazar’s (2001). Yazar’s
Bayesian incentive compatibility condition on a strategy bundle with the full
communication plan {zj,T j}j∈S becomes:
¬∃j ∈ S : ∃ ¯ t
j ∈ T
j : ∃ ˜ t
j ∈ T




































 N\{j} | ¯ t
j).
First, she made explicit the measurability of a strategy bundle (condi-
tion 2.3.1) with respect to the communication system that is endogenously
determined by a communication plan. According to Vohra’s scenario, the
mediator provides the reported information tS to each player j (when he
tells j to make choice zj(tS)). This scenario can be viewed as follows: The
players have chosen the full communication plan when deciding on the net
trade plan zj. Thus, we can place Vohra’s model in Yazar’s framework, by
viewing Vohra’s deﬁnition of strategy as a pair (zj,T j) of a net trade plan
and the full communication plan. Yazar’s condition 2.4.7 on a strategy bun-
dle with the full communication plan {zj,T j}j∈S and Vohra’s condition 2.4.5
on a T S-measurable strategy bundle zS are then the same in sprit. It is true
that there is a diﬀerence between the two conditions: According to Yazar’s
condition, j’s interim conditional expected utility is computed for each pos-
sible action he may make, zj(˜ tj,t N\{j}), tN\{j} ∈ T N\{j}, while according27
to Vohra’s condition, j’s interim conditional expected utility is obtained by
integration with respect to his possible actions; in short, there is separate
treatment of tN\{j} and t N\{j} in Yazar’s condition. However, we view that
this diﬀerence is minor.
Second, in Yazar’s framework an arbitrary communication plan (rather
than the full communication plan) is possible as a part of a strategy.
2.5 Descriptive solution concepts
Having presented formal models, we are ready to further specify how players
interact within the framework of a given model, and present the associated
descriptive solution of the game. From the viewpoint of the principal-agent
theory we may say, using the terminology of the principal-agent theory, that
most of the literature in the Bayesian cooperative theory to date has dealt
with the interactive mode in which each player plays both the role of principal
and the role of agent: Players get together to make coordinated strategy
choice as principals. After the grand coalition decides on its self-sustaining
strategy bundle (descriptive solution of the game), each player execute his
agreed strategy as an agent in an interim period. The solution is called ex
ante (interim, resp.), if it is agreed upon in the ex ante period (in an interim
period, resp.).
A strategy bundle as a function from the type proﬁle space (message-
proﬁle space) to the choice-bundle space may be considered a mechanism.
While the principal-agent theory of mechanism design explains a mechanism
simply as an optimal solution to the principal’s problem, the cooperative
theory explains it as an endogenous solution to the game.
2.5.1 Interim solution concepts
Wilson (1978) paid attention to availability of communication systems (deﬁ-
nition 2.1.4) in deﬁning two notions of core within the framework of Bayesian
pure exchange economy (example 2.2.1). Although he did not consider the
measurability condition (condition 2.3.1) or the Bayesian incentive compat-
ibility condition (condition 2.4.1 or 2.4.5), and the present paper does not
consider these conditions either in re-producing his core concepts, the reader
can easily incorporate the two conditions in Wilson’s core concepts. The28
reader can also easily extend Wilson’s core concepts to strong equilibrium
concepts for the Bayesian society (deﬁnition 2.1.3).
Given a Bayesian pure exchange economy Epe, deﬁne for each coalition S











   
 
 












The conditional expected utility function of commodity allocation plan (strat-
egy) xj given an algebra Aj associates with each state t ∈ T the conditional














where A(t) is the minimal element of Aj that contains t, and πj(·|A(t)) is
j’s conditional probability on T given event A(t) (so, for example, Euj(xj |
T j)(t)=Euj(xj | tj)). The following two solutions are interim concepts, and
are deﬁned for the general situation in which each consumer has subjective
interim probabilities {πj(·|tj)}tj∈Tj. The deﬁnitions allow for situations
in which these interim probabilities may not be derived from one ex ante
probability via the Bayes rule. The ﬁrst concept is for the situation in which
the members of a coalition can use only the null communication system.
DEFINITION 2.5.1 (Wilson, 1978) A commodity allocation plan x∗ is
said to be in the coarse core of Bayesian pure exchange economy Epe,i f
(i) x∗ ∈ F N
T ; and
(ii) if it is not true that
∃ S ∈N: ∃ E ∈∧ j∈ST











Condition (i) in deﬁnition 2.5.1 is feasibility8 of strategy bundle x∗; the
grand coalition is indeed formed in equilibrium and the members jointly
8 Deﬁnitions 2.5.1 and 2.5.2 of coarse core and ﬁne core do not impose the measurability
(deﬁnition 2.3.1) as a part of the feasibility condition on the solution. It is not clear how
far Wilson considered the measurability requirement. In the general formulation of an29
choose this bundle. Condition (ii) is the coalitional stability condition, some-
times called the group incentive compatibility; it makes precise the idea that
no coalition can improve upon x∗ in the following sense: No coalition S can
have an event E that all members of S can discern (E ∈∧ j∈ST j) and a
feasible consumption plan xS on E, such that every member j is made better
oﬀ with xj than with x∗j at each state in E according to his own private
information.
In the present extreme case of asymmetric information (T i∧Tj = {∅,T}
if i  = j), the coalitional stability condition for the coarse core becomes: the
individual rationality condition,
¬∃j ∈ N : ∃ t
j ∈ T










and the coalitional stability condition against non-singletons,











Here, the sets {tj}×T N\{j}, tj ∈ T j, are the minimal events that singleton
{j} can discern, and the entire space T is the only event that all members
in a non-singleton S,# S ≥ 2, can discern. The coarse core as an interim
solution is based on a very conservative attitude towards coalition-formation:
Even when player j has the private information ¯ tj, he wants to make sure
before joining a defecting non-singleton coalition S and agreeing on a joint
strategy xj that he is made better oﬀ at every type tj ∈ T j, including those
that he knows have not realized.
If we weaken the individual rationality condition to











which the subsequent literature has done, the resulting weak coalitional sta-
bility condition for the coarse core is weaker than the coalitional stability
condition for the ex ante core; see deﬁnitions 2.5.5 and 2.5.6.
arbitrarily given state space Ω (which may not be a type proﬁle space), in which player
j’s private information structure is given as an algebra Fj on Ω, Wilson (1978, page 808,
lines 7-10) did require measurability of each strategy with respect to some algebra F  .
But the algebra F   is assumed to be ﬁner than ∨j∈NFj. Then, in the present formulation
of the type proﬁle space (Ω =
 
j∈N T j and Fj = T j), the algebra F   is necessarily the
ﬁnest algebra 2T, so his measurability does not impose any condition on strategies.30
The second concept is for the situation in which each coalition S is a
priori endowed with a family of feasible communication systems, C(S).
DEFINITION 2.5.2 (Wilson, 1978) For each coalition S, let C(S)b e
an a priori given family of feasible communication systems which contains
the full communication system.9 A commodity allocation plan x∗ is said
to be in the ﬁne core of Bayesian pure exchange economy Epe with C(S),
S ∈N,i f
(i) x∗ ∈ F N
T ; and
(ii) if it is not true that
∃ S ∈N: ∃{ A
j}j∈S ∈ C(S):∃ E ∈∧ j∈SA











An important question that Wilson left open to future research is clariﬁ-
cation of the process according to which the members of coalition S come to
be endowed with communication systems C(S). More generally, the process
of updating information structure from T j to a ﬁner structure needs to be
explained. Depending upon speciﬁcation of such information-revelation pro-
cess, the solution to the game as given in deﬁnition 2.5.2 may no longer be
appropriate. This issue will be picked up in subsection 3.2.
A coalition is formed when its members agree on a type-proﬁle-contingent
choices, which they will execute after the formation. Notice that there is
asymmetry between the grand coalition’s formation and a blocking coalition’s
formation, as formulated in the coalitional stability condition for the ﬁne core:
The condition includes as one of the requirements,
¬∃S ∈N: ∃ t
S ∈ T











since the full communication system is available. On the one hand, the grand
coalition needs to prepare contingencies for all type proﬁles (x∗ is deﬁned on
the entire space T). On the other hand, a blocking coalition S needs only
to decide on a choice bundle xS(tS) ∈ CS for its formation. Here, we are
9 Another interpretation of Wilson (1978, p.813, the third paragraph) is that each family
C(S) is given as the family of all communication systems for S, {{Aj}j∈S |Tj ⊂A j ⊂
T S}.31
assuming that xS does not depend on the outsiders’ types, tN\S. So, the
domain of a function xS ∈ F S
{tS}×TN\S is the singleton, {tS}, and consequently
the space F S







If we postulate that coalition formation requires planning of choices for
all contingencies, that is, if we remove the asymmetry problem of the pre-
ceding paragraph, and if we consider the private information case, we obtain
a related notion of equilibrium which enjoys the strong coalitional stability
property that it cannot be improved upon by any coalition regardless of its
type proﬁle. In view of the conceptual importance, we present this notion in
the most general framework (deﬁnition 2.1.3) satisfying the private measura-
bility (condition 2.3.1 for the null communication system) and the Bayesian
incentive compatibility (condition 2.4.1):
DEFINITION 2.5.3 Let S be a Bayesian society, and consider the private
information case. A strategy bundle x∗ ∈ X is called an interim Bayesian
incentive-compatible strong equilibrium,i f
(i) x∗ ∈ ˆ F N(x∗); and
(ii) it is not true that
∃ S ∈N: ∃ t
S ∈ T
S : ∃ x
S ∈ ˆ F
S(x
∗):








The strong equilibrium is an appropriate solution concept for the situa-
tions in which coalitions are interdependent, that is, the outsiders’ strategy-
choice inﬂuences the insiders of a coalition through their utility functions
or through the coalition’s feasible-strategy correspondence. When there is
no interdependence, an interim Bayesian incentive-compatible strong equi-
librium reduces to an interim Bayesian incentive-compatible core strategy
bundle. The non-interdependence case is obtained when each utility func-
tion uj depends on Cj × T and each feasible-strategy correspondence F S is
a constant correspondence.
A very speciﬁc instance of the interim Bayesian incentive-compatible core
was used in Ichiishi and Sertel’s (1998) study of a proﬁt-center game (example
2.2.3).32
In accordance with the mediator-based approach to the Bayesian pure

















xS is T S-measurable, and






Vohra (1999) introduced Bayesian incentive compatibility to the coarse core:
DEFINITION 2.5.4 (Vohra, 1999) Given the mediator-based approach,
a commodity allocation plan x∗ : T → Rl·#N is said to be in the coarse core
of Bayesian pure exchange economy Epe,i f
(i) x∗ ∈ F
ic,N
T ; and











Our ﬁnal conceptual issue about the interim solution is the deﬁnition
of contract. When each player j knows his true type ¯ tj, it is questionable
whether a contract has to specify all his choices contingent on his types that
he knows have not realized; that is, a strategy may not be identiﬁed with a
contract.
In order to see this point, we recall here how the principal-agent theory
has addressed this issue. Consider a typical insurance contract theory, in
which the insured’s probability of causing an accident is his type (his pri-
vate information), the insurer’s type is common knowledge, the insurer is the
principal, the insureds are the agents, and the insurer designs a full-coverage
insurance policy as a pair f(t) of a premium and a deductible for each pos-
sible type t of the insured. Function f : T → R2 is a principal’s strategy,
called a mechanism. The optimal mechanism f∗ is the principal’s equilibrium
strategy. Strategy f∗ is not a contract; rather, the image of f∗ is interpreted
as the set of contracts (insurance policies) he oﬀers to the insureds. Due
to Bayesian incentive compatibility, insureds of a speciﬁc type t voluntarily
choose the contract designed for t, namely f∗(t).
In studying the proﬁt center game with incomplete information (example
2.2.3), Ichiishi and Sertel (1998) interpreted the image x∗(T)o fa ninterim
core strategy bundle x∗ as the set of oﬀered contracts. To appropriately
deﬁne the interim contract concept seems to be determined by speciﬁcity of
economic contents of the model.33
2.5.2 Ex ante solution concepts
We turn to the ex ante solution concepts. A strategy is identiﬁed with a
contract here.
Yannelis (1991) addressed the T j-measurability in the private information
case (condition 2.3.1 for the null communication system) in his core analysis
of the Bayesian pure exchange economy Epe (example 2.2.1). We present
a somewhat stronger deﬁnition than his original private information core
concept (see remark 2.5.7 below). The reader can easily extend his core
concept to the strong equilibrium concept for the Bayesian society (deﬁnition
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DEFINITION 2.5.5 (Yannelis, 1991) Let Epe be a Bayesian pure ex-
change economy in the private information case. A commodity allocation
plan x∗ is called a private information core allocation,i f
(i) x∗ ∈ F  N: and
(ii) it is not true that
∃ S ∈N: ∃ x
S ∈ F





where Euj(xj) is the ex ante expected utility of xj.
Ichiishi and Idzik (1996) incorporated the Bayesian incentive compatibil-
ity condition (condition 2.4.1) in the strong equilibrium analysis:
DEFINITION 2.5.6 (Ichiishi and Idzik, 1996) Let S be a Bayesian
society in the private information case. A strategy bundle x∗ ∈ X is called
an ex ante Bayesian incentive-compatible strong equilibrium,i f
(i) x∗ ∈ ˆ F N(x∗); and
(ii) it is not true that
∃ S ∈N: ∃ x
S ∈ ˆ F
S(x






The existence question on these ex ante solutions will be addressed in
subsections 3.1 and 3.5.34
The feasibility condition (i) reﬂects the scenario that the grand coalition
is formed in equilibrium. For applications to economies with production,
however, we frequently need to explain formation and coexistence of several
coalitions (ﬁrms). It is easy to extend the Bayesian incentive-compatible
strong equilibrium concept, ex ante or interim, so that a coalition structure
is realized in equilibrium (see Ichiishi, 1993a).
REMARK 2.5.7 In both the original deﬁnitions of the ex ante private
core and the ex ante Bayesian incentive-compatible strong equilibrium, the











with strict inequality for at least one tj. While this formulation clariﬁes the
relationship with Wilson’s interim coarse core concept or the interim coarse
strong equilibrium concept (see the second paragraph following deﬁnition
2.5.1), the present condition (ii) is a stronger coalitional stability condition.
The existence proofs of Yannelis (1991) and Ichiishi and Idzik (1996) actually
establish the existence of these stronger solutions.
￿
Einy, Moreno and Shitovitz (2001b) looked at the bargaining set of a
Bayesian pure exchange economy with a nonatomic measure space of con-
sumers.
2.5.3 Other interactive modes
Another interactive mode studied is a multi-principal, multi-agent relation-
ship. The player set N is partitioned into the set of principals and the set
of agents. The principals play a cooperative game, taking into account the
agents’ reactions to their coordinated strategy bundle. While there is no gen-
eral theory of this mode, Ichiishi and Koray (2000) studied a speciﬁc model of
education, a version of Spence’ model. In their model, the ﬁrst-stage game
played by the principals have the same feature as the prisoner’s dilemma
game, so there exists no cooperative equilibrium.
In closing this section, we point out a central question left open in the
area of Bayesian noncooperative game: how to capture and formulate the
interim market mechanism in the general equilibrium framework.35
The question includes a sensible deﬁnition of competitive equilibrium.
The required notion is expected to share many features with the rational
expectations equilibrium, but we believe that in order to fully describe the
individual price-taking behavior in the market, an individual demand func-
tion needs to be well deﬁned on the entire price simplex ∆l−1 := {p ∈ Rl
+ |
 l
h=1 ph =1 }, whereas it is deﬁned only on a negligible subset of ∆l−1 in
the rational expectations equilibrium framework with a ﬁnite state space Ω.
To see this last point on the rational expectations equilibrium, suppose the
government announces message function (price function) p :Ω→ ∆l−1.I f
consumer i observes a (possibly disequilibrium) price vector p, he believes
that the event p−1(p)( ⊂ Ω) occurs. He then conditions his probability on Ω
given p−1(p), and chooses his demand. But the event p−1(p) could be empty
(or it may have probability 0) unless the observed price p is in the range of
function, p(Ω). Thus the demand cannot be naturally deﬁned outside the
range p(Ω). If, for example, Ω is a ﬁnite set, then the range p(Ω) is also
ﬁnite, so the demand function is undeﬁnable almost everywhere.
Once we accomplish the task of formulating the interim market mecha-
nism, we can provide a reliable analysis of the market of lemon, and analyses
of simultaneous workings of the market resource allocation mechanism and
the non-market resource allocation mechanisms instituted in organizations
(ﬁrms).
3 Issues to Address
We review the issues that have been addressed in the Bayesian cooperative
game theory to date: existence theorems for descriptive solutions (subsec-
tion 3.1 for the general framework, and subsection 3.5.1 for the Bayesian
pure exchange economy); analyses of information revelation processes (sub-
section 3.2); deﬁnitions of Pareto eﬃciency (subsection 3.3); comparison of
the ﬁne core and the ex post core, and comparison of implications of the
two required conditions, measurability and Bayesian incentive compatibility
(subsection 3.4); revival of the core convergence theorem within the frame-
work of the Bayesian pure exchange economy (subsection 3.5.2); and other
views on coalition formation, speciﬁcally analyses of situations in which coali-
tional membership is anonymous (subsection 3.6). We also present our view
on how to evaluate the existence and the nonexistence results at the end of36
subsection 3.1.
3.1 Existence
Wilson (1978) established a coarse core nonemptiness theorem, by construct-
ing from the Bayesian pure exchange economy the following non-side-payment
game, and by showing that the latter game satisﬁes the assumptions in Scarf’s
(1973, theorem 8.3.6, p. 211) core nonemptiness theorem. In Wilson’s asso-
ciated game, a player is deﬁned as a pair (j,tj) of a consumer and his private
information. The admissible coalitions are those of the form,
(S,E): ={(j,t

















   
 
∃ xS ∈ F S
E :
∀ j ∈ S :( ∀ tj : {tj}×T N\{j} ⊂ E):





No general existence theorem has been established for the interim Bayesian
incentive-compatible strong equilibrium or for the interim Bayesian incentive-
compatible core strategy bundle. So nonemptiness of the ﬁne core also re-
mains open. For a particular numerical example of the Bayesian pure ex-
change economy with family C(S) which contains both the full communica-
tion system and the null communication system, Wilson (1978, p.814) made
the following interesting observation in regard to the non-existence of a ﬁne
core allocation plan: By considering the blocking behavior of coalitions using
the full communication system, the initial endowment is shown to be the only
candidate for an unblocked allocation. But the initial endowment is blocked
by the grand coalition using its null communication system.
Yannelis (1991) established a private information core allocation exis-
tence theorem for an inﬁnite Bayesian pure exchange economy. For the ﬁnite
economy, an existence theorem can be proved by direct application of Scarf’s
theorem for nonemptiness of the core (see, e.g., Scarf (1973, theorem 8.3.6,
p. 211)) to the non-side-payment game deﬁned by
V (S): ={u ∈ R
N |∃x
S ∈ F
 S : ∀ j ∈ S : uj ≤ Eu
j(x
j)}.37
Lefebvre (2001) extended Yannelis’ (1991) private information core allo-
cation existence theorem to an inﬁnite Bayesian pure exchange economy with
ex ante non-ordered preference relations.
REMARK 3.1.1 One can easily extend the coarse core allocation concept
and the private information core allocation concept for the Bayesian pure
exchange economy to the coarse strong equilibrium concept and the private
information strong equilibrium concept for the Bayesian society (deﬁnition
2.1.3), and establish existence theorems for these extended concepts.
￿
Ichiishi and Idzik (1996) established a Bayesian incentive-compatible str-
ong equilibrium existence theorem for the Bayesian society: They ﬁrst es-
tablish an existence theorem for the general class of Bayesian societies with
externalities in which each utility function uj depends fully on (c,t) ∈ C×T.
The assumptions in these theorems are stated, however, partly in terms of
derivative concepts such as the parameterized non-side-payment games. Sec-
ond, they derived from the theorem for the general class an existence theorem
for the speciﬁc class of Bayesian societies without externalities in which each
utility function uj depends only on (cj,t) ∈ Cj × T. Assumptions of the
theorem for this speciﬁc class are stated only in terms of the exogenously
given data S. Notice that in spite of the terminology “no-externalities”, the
feasible-strategy correspondences F S depend fully on x ∈ X, and to this
extent externalities are still considered. The Scarf theorem for nonemptiness
of the core of a balanced non-side-payment game is not applicable here, since
a Bayesian incentive-compatible strong equilibrium is a ﬁxed point of the
core-strategy correspondence which maps each strategy bundle ¯ x to the set










∃ xS ∈ ˆ F S : ∀ j ∈ S :
Euj(xS,x ∗N\S) >E u j(x∗)
 
,
but the correspondence is in general disconnected-set valued, so even if we can
apply the Scarf theorem to each parameterized game V¯ x, we cannot obtain a
ﬁxed point. Ichiishi and Idzik (1996) applied a social coalitional equilibrium
existence theorem (see, e.g., Ichiishi (1993)).
We present the main result of Ichiishi and Idzik (1996) for the no-externality
case. Of course, given the no-externality condition, the normal-form games
or the Bayesian games are no longer included in the analysis, but economic38
models extended to cover asymmetric information are included, e.g., the pure
exchange economy, the coalition production economy, and the production
economy with interdependent organizations that coexist as ﬁrms. Due to
the full dependence of F S on x ∈ X, the core of a production economy with
public goods can also be analyzed (given the outsiders’ production of public
goods speciﬁed in xN\S the insiders’ feasible strategy set F S(x) describes the
sum of these public goods and the insiders’ production possibility set).
A subfamily B of N is called balanced if there exists {λS}S∈B ⊂ R+ such
that
 
S∈B:S j λS = 1 for every j ∈ N.
THEOREM 3.1.2 (Ichiishi and Idzik, 1996) Let S be a Bayesian
society in the private information case. Assume that each von Neumann-
Morgenstern utility function uj depends only on Cj × T. Assume also
(i) for any j, Cj is a nonempty, compact, convex, and metrizable subset of a
Hausdorﬀ locally convex topological vector space over R;
(ii) for any j and any t, uj(·,t) is continuous and linear aﬃne in Cj;
(iii) for any S and any t, CS
0(t) is nonempty, closed and convex;
(iv) for any S, correspondence F S is both upper and lower semicontinuous
in X, and has nonempty, closed and convex values;
(v) for any ¯ x ∈ X and any balanced family B with the associated balancing




S(¯ x) ⊂ F
N(¯ x),
where ˜ F S(¯ x): ={x | xS ∈ F S(¯ x),x N\S = 0};
(vi) for any S, either F S is a constant correspondence, or for any S and any
¯ x ∈ X, there exists ˆ xS ∈ F S(¯ x), such that for all j ∈ S and all ¯ tj,˜ tj ∈ T j
for which ¯ tj  = ˜ tj,
Eu
j(ˆ x




j) | ¯ t
j).
Then, there exists a Bayesian incentive-compatible strong equilibrium of S.
The aﬃne linearity condition (ii) on uj(·,t) requires some comments: If
choices here are interpreted as pure choices, then this assumption imposes
the strong condition of risk-neutrality on the players’ preference relations. If,
on the other hand, choices are interpreted as mixed choices, then the utility
here should be interpreted as the expected utility. Of course, the expected39
utility is linear in probabilities, so the assumption is automatically satisﬁed
under the second interpretation of the choices (that is, the aﬃne linearity
does not have to be stated as an assumption); see corollary 3.5.2 below.
Sketch of the Proof of Theorem 3.1.2 We only need to show that the static
society ({Xj,Eu j}j∈N, { ˆ F S}S∈N) satisﬁes conditions of a social coalitional
equilibrium existence theorem (see, e.g., Ichiishi (1993, Theorem 3.4.11, p.
105)). Upper semicontinuity of each ˆ F S is easy to prove. Lower semiconti-
nuity of each ˆ F S can be proved by applying the standard argument for lower
semicontinuity of the budget-set correspondece in the consumer theory, us-
ing assumptions (ii), (iv) and (vi); here the aﬃne linearity of Euj on Xj is
needed. Using assumptions (ii) and (v), the inclusion of assumption (v) is
also satisﬁed for ˆ F S; here the aﬃne linearity of Euj on Xj is needed again.
￿
REMARK 3.1.3 The above proof also establishes that the same conditions
guarantee the existence of a Bayesian incentive-compatible strong equilibrium
of S for the mediator-based approach (so that each strategy in coalition S is
T S-measurable).
￿
Ever since Ichiishi and Idzik established an earlier version of theorem
3.1.2 in early summer 1991, the need for the aﬃne linearity assumption on
utility functions (ii) when Bayesian incentive compatibility is involved had
been known in profession, but in a very speciﬁc model (like the pure exchange
economy) this assumption can be avoided due to the speciﬁc structure of the
model and the deﬁnition of a strategy (see, e.g., theorem 3.5.3). For an
example of a Bayesian society with linear utility functions which does not
satisfy the balancedness assumption on feasible-strategy correspondences (v),
so has an empty core, see remark 3.5.4.
We present our view on how to evaluate the existence and the nonex-
istence results. Each economic or game-theoretical model mimics the real
world we live in, and each interactive mode speciﬁes players’ relationships
according to which a game is played. The associated descriptive solution is
the outcome that we (analysts) expect to prevail in equilibrium as a result of
play of the game, so describes the phenomenon observed in the real world.
If the existence of an equilibrium (e.g., existence of a core allocation or of a
Bayesian incentive-compatible strong equilibrium) is guaranteed, we capture
the nature of the real phenomena as properties of the equilibrium.40
In the case the existence is unlikely, the theorists have held three alterna-
tive views on the solution in the past. The ﬁrst view asserts that the solution
is a wrong concept to apply to the real world, so proposes to adopt an alter-
native solution or even to formulate an alternative model. In the prisoner’s
dilemma game, for example, a strong equilibrium does not exist. Theorists
have sometimes said, “So, the strong equilibrium concept is problematic.”
Since the unique Nash equilibrium in the same game is not Pareto optimal,
theorists have also studied the repeated game (another game) and invoked
the folk theorem in order to achieve a Pareto optimal outcome of the original
one-shot game.
We contend, however, that the ﬁrst view does not solve the original prob-
lem of understanding the real world; we endorse the following second and
the third views. The second view takes the nonexistence result as a warning
signal that the model misses important aspects of the reality. To remedy the
problem, therefore, we improve the model so that the modiﬁed model better
reﬂects the real world and interactive mode.
The third view concerns the situation in which the model captures the
essence of the study object, so cannot be improved. Then, we want to ana-
lyze a game played within the framework of this model, and not a game in an
imaginary world. We also want to study the speciﬁc interactive mode that
also mimics the pattern of play in the real world. If the associated solution
does not exist, we do not apply another solution, since the latter reﬂects an
unrealistic pattern of play. Instead, we accept the fact that the observed
phenomena are disequilibrium phenomena, that is, phenomena which we ex-
perience in the course of successive formations of blocking coalitions. Thus,
if the existence of an equilibrium is not guaranteed, the study object should
be the endless formations of coalitions.10
3.2 Approaches to information revelation
Each player j is endowed with his private information structure T j,s oh e
knows his true type ¯ tj at the beginning of the interim period. By the time the
10 We quoted the prisoner’s dilemma game for the expository purpose. We do not say
that this one-shot game mimics the major aspects of the present-day world, or that the
associated repeated game is unrealistic. On the contrary, the implications of long-run
threat and commitment in the repeated game, as formalized in the folk theorem, constitute
a real principle working in the present-day world.41
strategy execution is over, player j will have narrowed down the range of his
colleague i’s possible true types to a subset A
j
i of T i. In other words, while
the players start with the null communication system {T j}j∈N, they end
up with an endogenously determined ﬁner communication system {Aj}j∈N.
This information revelation process is not easy to analyze, since a player j
may not want to pass on his private information to his colleagues, and even if
j decides to do so, his colleagues may think that j is not truthfully passing on
his information but is trying to manipulate them with false information. This
subsection will review two approaches taken in the literature for endogenous
determination of an information structure: passive information revelation
by action; and active information revelation by credible transmission of in-
formation (e.g., by credible talking). The ﬁrst approach is classiﬁed into
two speciﬁc approaches: information revelation by contract execution, and
information revelation by choosing a contract. There are works for the infor-
mation revelation by contract execution and for the information revelation by
credible transmission of information; we will review them in subsections 3.2.1
and 3.2.3. We will present in subsection 3.2.2 known examples to illustrate
the idea about the information revelation by choosing a contract.
3.2.1 By contract execution
This approach borrows ideas for information update from the rational extpec-
tations equilibrium analysis. In the latter framework, somebody announces
a price function p : T → Rl to the economic agents. When an economic
agent observes a price vector p, he realizes that the event p−1(p) ⊂ T has
occurred (see, e.g., Radner (1979)). In the Bayesian society in the private
information case, the members of coalition S agree on a strategy bundle xS,
everybody in the coalition knows his collegue i’s strategy xi,s oi fi makes a
choice ci then the members of S realize that the event (xi)
−1 (ci) ⊂ T has
occurred. Choice is postulated to be observable, so moral hazard problems
are excluded.
This subsection presents two works on this information revelation pro-
cess, Ichiishi, Idzik and Zhao (1994), and Ichiishi and Radner (1999). The
essential message of these works is that even if a game starts with the situ-
ation characterized as the private information case, it ends up with the full
communication system.
Ichiishi, Idzik and Zhao (1994) studied an ex ante determination of a42
strategy bundle, taking into account the above process in the general frame-
work of the Bayesian society S (deﬁnition 2.1.3). For full analysis of players
behavior before and after update of information, they introduced an addi-
tional structure to S (postulates 3.2.1 and 3.2.2 below). The ﬁrst postulate
says that each player makes choice twice, once in the ﬁrst interim period,
and then in the second interim period. The players act simultaneously at
each round.














2, resp.) at his information
set of the ﬁrst interim period (the second interim period, resp.).
For two information structures B and C (algebras on T), denote by B∨C
the algebra generated by B∪C(the smallest algebra on T that contains both
B and C). For any set Z and any function f : T → Z, denote by A(f)
the algebra generated by f (the smallest algebra on T that contains the sets
{f−1(z) | z ∈ Z}).





Given a strategy bundle xS, information is processed within coalition S in
the following way: In the ﬁrst interim period, each player has only his own
private information. So, the component x
j
1(·) has to be T j-measurable. If it
is common knowledge in S that player j has the incentive to make a choice
(say, c
j
1) in the ﬁrst interim period according to his true type, then by the









has become common knowledge in S. Let ¯ t be the true type proﬁle, and
suppose choice bundle cS
1 ∈ CS
1 is made in the ﬁrst interim period. Then
each player j has the information that event
{t ∈ T | t






has occurred with probability 1.
When designing the other component of the strategy bundle xS
2 =( xi
2)i∈S,








is available to i at the beginning of the second interim period, and make each
xi
2 measurable with respect to it. Thus, we can make the following postulate
of information-revelation process:
POSTULATE 3.2.2 Given any strategy bundle ¯ x ∈ X, coalition S designs
only those xS ∈ F S(¯ x) such that for all j ∈ S it follows that
(i) x
j
1 is measurable with respect to T j, and
(ii) x
j
2 is measurable with respect to ˆ T j(xS
1).
Denote by F  S(¯ x) the set of those feasible strategies xS that satisfy pos-
tulate 3.2.2 (information-revelation process):
F












   
∀ j ∈ S :
x
j
1 is measurable with respect to T j, and
x
j






Recall that in order for the present information-revelation process to
work, the members of coalition S need to have the common knowledge that
each player has the incentive to make a choice in the ﬁrst interim period
according to his true type. After all, the contract will not be enforced, if
some member has the incentive to make a choice with false pretension about
his true type either during the ﬁrst interim period or during the second in-
terim period. If the members of S foresee at the time of contract design
that a particular contract xS may later induce such false pretension, they
do not agree on the contract xS. Instead of the strategy set F  S(¯ x), there-
fore, they will consider only the restricted subset ˆ F S(¯ x) of those strategy
bundles that are Bayesian incentive-compatible. The deﬁnition of Bayesian
incentive compatibility in the context of postulates 3.2.1 and 3.2.2 is much
involved; see the Appendix for the detail. With the feasible-strategy cor-
respondences ˆ F S : X → XS modiﬁed this way, we can deﬁne a Bayesian
incentive-compatible strong equilibrium as in deﬁnition 2.5.6.
The diﬃculty in establishing an existence theorem for the present Bayesian
incentive-compatible strong equilibrium lies in the fact that even if F S is well-
behaved, ˆ F S is not convex-valued or upper semicontinuous, so the standard
existence techniques do not apply. Ichiishi, Idzik and Zhao (1994) provided
generic existence theorems for a Bayesian incentive-compatible strong equi-
librium. Again, a generic existence thoerem is established ﬁrst for the general
class of Bayesian societies with externalities in which each utility function44
uj depends fully on (c,t) ∈ C × T, and then as its application a generic
existence theorem is established for the speciﬁc class of Bayesian societies
without externalities11 in which each utility function uj depends only on
(cj,t j) ∈ Cj × T j. Assumptions of the theorem for this speciﬁc class are
stated only in terms of the exogenously given data S’s; this theorem is pre-
sented below (Theorems 3.2.3). Notice again that in spite of the terminology
“no-externalities”, the feasible-strategy correspondences F S depend fully on
x ∈ X, and to this extent externalities are still considered.











(deﬁnition 2.1.3), with a rich structure (postulates 3.2.1 and 3.2.2) and the
further assumption of no-externalities. One part of the data ({Cj,Tj,u j}j∈N,
{CS
0 }S∈N,π ) will be ﬁxed throughout. By changing the other part of the













By varying {F S}S∈N, one obtains the space of Bayesian societies, SPACEne.
The space will be endowed with a natural pseudo-metric d. The pseudo-
metric space (SPACEne,d) of Bayesian societies will thus be constructed.
A property P is called a generic property of a Bayesian society in SPACEne,
if there exists an open and dense subset SPACE 
ne of (SPACEne,d) such that
every S∈SPACE
 
ne satisﬁes P. The following theorem 3.2.3 clariﬁes con-
ditions on SPACEne under which the following is a generic property of a
Bayesian society: There exist multitude of Bayesian incentive-compatible
strong equilibria, and there exists a Bayesian incentive-compatible strong
equilibrium x∗ such that it fully reveals private information by the end of
the ﬁrst interim period. Thus, a Bayesian society generically has a Bayesian
incentive-compatible strong equilibrium which processes the null communica-
tion system to the full communication system through players’ actions during
the ﬁrst interim period.
In the context of the present structure (postulates 3.2.1 and 3.2.2), the
essential role of the feasible-strategy correspondences {F S}S∈N in Bayesian
11 The concept of no-externalities is more stringent here than in theorem 3.1.2.45













   
∀ j ∈ S :
x
j
1 is T j-measurable, and
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We will give a precise deﬁnition of set SPACEne: It consists of all Bayesian
societies satisfying the following conditions 1 through 5. The ﬁrst two condi-
tions are on the ﬁxed data ({Cj,Tj,u j}j∈N,{CS
0 }S∈N,π ), hence on the ﬁxed
strategy-spaces Xj := {xj : T → Cj}. Conditions 3-5 are on each {F S}S
which deﬁnes a member of SPACEne.
1. (i) For every j ∈ N, his choice set Cj is a nonempty, compact, convex
and metrizable subset of a real Hausdorﬀ locally convex topological
vector space. (ii) For every j ∈ N, his von Neumann-Morgenstern
utility function uj depends only on (cj,t j) ∈ Cj × T j, and moreover,
uj(· ,t j) is linear aﬃne and continuous on C
j
0 for each tj.
2. For each j ∈ N, there exist cj
m ∈ Cj and a ﬁnite subset C
j
f of Cj
such that (i) for all cj ∈ C
j
f and all tj ∈ T j, uj(cj,t j) >u j(cj
m,t j);
(ii) for all cj,c  j ∈ C
j
f for which cj  = c j, it follows that c
j
1  = c
 j
1 ; (iii)
for all tj,t  j ∈ T j for which tj  = t j, there exist cj,c  j ∈ C
j
f such that
uj(cj,t j) >u j(c j,t j), and uj(c j,t  j) >u j(cj,t  j).
3. (i) For each S ∈N , correspondence GS : X → CS is upper and
lower semicontinuous in X, and for each ¯ x ∈ X, GS(¯ x) is nonempty,
closed and convex. (ii) The correspondence GN(·) is a constant cor-
respondence on X, so one may write GN := GN(¯ x). The set GN is
relatively strictly convex (the strict convex combinations of any two
distinct members of GN are in the relative interior of GN). There exist
x,x  ∈ GN such that Eu(x)   Eu(x ).
4. Choose any ¯ x ∈ X and any balanced subfamily B of N\{ N} with the
associated balancing coeﬃcients {λS}S∈B. For each S ∈Bchoose any
























Then, x ∈ GN.
5. For each S ∈None of the following two conditions holds true: (i) GS(·)
is a constant correspondence; or (ii) For each j ∈ S, there exists a ﬁnite
subset C
j
f of Cj such that for every ¯ x ∈ X,
 
j∈S{xj : T j → co C
j
f}⊂
F S(¯ x), and such that for all tj,t  j ∈ T j for which tj  = t j, there exist
cj,c  j ∈ C
j
f so that uj(cj,t j) >u j(c j,t j), and uj(c j,t  j) >u j(cj,t  j).
Here, the convex hull of a subset A of a vector space is denoted by
co A.
Condition 1 (i) is standard in economic theory. Condition 1 (ii) describes
no-externalities, and moreover, imposes a condition which is interpreted in




2 consists only of pure





2 consists only of mixed choices (or probabilities on pure-
choices) for j,i fuj(· ,t j) is interpreted as the expected utility as a function
of j’s mixed-choice pairs, and if the underlying von Neumann-Morgenstern
utility function is additively separable with respect to the pure choice of the
ﬁrst interim period and the pure choice of the second interim period, then
condition (ii) is automatically satisﬁed.
Conditions 2 and 5 (ii) are made so that they guarantee existence of a
strictly Bayesian incentive-compatible strategy bundle; see Abreu and Mat-
sushima’s lemma (lemma 2.4.2).
Condition 4 is a version of the balancedness condition on the sets {GS(¯ x)}S∈N,
and makes explicit the extent to which the grand coalition has a large feasible-
strategy set GN. It means (1) that for each j the combination of the strategies
{x(S)j}S∈B:S j with the convex coeﬃcients {λS}S∈B:S j is feasible in the grand
coalition; and (2) that each member j is insured in the grand coalition to be
able to choose xj(¯ tj) at any state t ∈{ ¯ tj}×T N\{j}.
Since each Cj is a metric space (Assumption 5.2 (i)) and T is ﬁnite, Xj
is also a metric space. Denote by ρS the Hausdorﬀ distance on the closed







Notice that d may not be a metric, since two distinct sets, F S(¯ x) and F †S(¯ x),
may give rise to the identical sets, GS(¯ x)=G†S(¯ x).47
THEOREM 3.2.3 (Ichiishi, Idzik and Zhao, 1994) Let (SPACEne, d)
be the pseudo-metric space of Bayesian societies without externalities sat-
isfying postulates 3.2.1 and 3.2.2. The following is a generic property of
a Bayesian society in (SPACEne, d): There exist multitude of Bayesian
incentive-compatible strong equilibria, and there exists a Bayesian incentive-
compatible strong equilibrium x∗ such that x
∗j
1 is 1-1 on T j.12
Sketch of the proof The proof borrows Radner’s (1979) idea for a generic
rational expectations equilibrium existence theorem: Given a Bayesian so-
ciety S, we consider the auxiliary society in which the set F  S(¯ x) of feasi-
ble strategies satisfying the information-revelation process is replaced by set
GS(¯ x). The correspondences {GS}S∈N are well behaved; in particular they
are lower semicontinuous and convex-valued, if the originally given feasible-
strategy correspondences {F S}S∈N are lower semicontinuous and convex-
valued. Thus, the same technique for proving theorem 3.1.2 is applicable to
the auxiliary society. We then prove that the auxiliary societies generically
have a Bayesian incentive-compatible strong equilibrium x∗ such that the
ﬁrst interim period strategy x
∗j
1 is 1-1 for every j. Then x∗ is a member of
ˆ F N(x∗), so is the required equilibrium.
￿
Ichiishi and Radner (1999) addressed the information revelation process
via action within the setup of proﬁt center game with incomplete information










and a price vector of the market commodities p ∈ R
km
+ (example 2.2.3).
Due to the speciﬁc structure of the model, they could establish exact exis-
tence theorems for a full-information revealing ex ante core plan (Bayesian
strong equilibrium in the present framework), rather than a mere generic
existence theorem. Some theorems are valid even for games that are ruled
out from space SPACEne. Of course, postulates 3.2.1 and 3.2.2 are made
here. Indeed, the two-interim-period framework naturally arises from the
economic context: The ﬁrst interim period is the setup period, and the sec-
ond interim period is the manufacturing period. The setup period is for the
12 Function x
∗j
1 is T j-measurable, iﬀ it may be considered a function only of tj ∈ T j.A
T j-measurable function is called 1-1 on T j, if it is 1-1 as a function deﬁned on T j.48
divisions’ simultaneous decisions about initial investment, setting up their
manufacturing processes. The manufacturing period is for subsequent deci-
sions about actual choice of an input-output vector, and for imputation of
the proﬁt that is made by sale/purchase of the market commodities. We will
review this work now.
Given a type proﬁle t ∈ T,aproﬁt imputation of coalition S is a vector
xS(t): =( xj(t))j∈S whose jth coordinate is the accounting proﬁt attributed to
division j.Aproﬁt imputation plan of coalition S is a function xS : T → RS,
t  → xS(t). Denoting by yS : T → R(km+kn)·#S a net output plan, a pair
(xS,yS) will henceforth be called a plan.
Let K be the index set of all commodities; it is partitioned into the
index set Km of marketed commodities and the index set Kn of nonmarketed
commodities. Let K1 (K2, resp.) denote the index set for the commodities
that are produced/used in the setup period (in the manufacturing period,
resp.). The family {K1,K 2} is a partition of K, possibly diﬀerent from

















2(t), resp.) correspond to K1 (K2, resp.).
Deﬁne yj
m and yj
n similarly corresponding to Km and Kn. Deﬁne also K1n :=
K1∩Kn, k1n := #K1n, and deﬁne K2n, K1m, K2m, k2n, k1m and k2m similarly.


















To start the precise description of the scenario, denote by F S the set of
all technologically attainable plans of a coalition S, that is, the set of all T S-









and such that the total resource constraint is satisﬁed within S, i.e.,

















Notice that negative imputation is allowed.13
Suppose coalition S is to form. The members can consider only plans
which obey the information pooling rule; let F  S to be the set of those allow-










∀ j ∈ S :
y
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The members further restrict their plans to those that satisfy the Bayesian
incentive compatibility (see Appendix for a precise deﬁnition). Let ˆ F S be
the set of allowable, Bayesian incentive-compatible plans for S.
The Bayesian incentive compatibility may be too stringent a condition
that there may not be a strategy in ˆ F N which is coalitionally stable. To
overcome this diﬃculty, the headquarters play the role of an insurer. A plan
(xS,yS) is called weakly Bayesian incentive-compatible if for all j ∈ S, and
all ¯ tj,˜ tj ∈ T j, it follows that
E(x
j | ¯ t
j) ≥ E(xj ◦ (˜ t
j, id) | ¯ t
j).
It is not diﬃcult to show that for a weakly Bayesian incentive-compatible
plan (xS,yS), the conditional expectation E(xj | tj) is independent of tj, that
is, E(xj |T j) is a constant function. This fact motivates the following
formulation of the postulate of the headquarters’ insurability:
POSTULATE 3.2.4 Let (xN,yN) be a technologically attainable plan of
the grand coalition such that it satisﬁes the information-revelation process,
and E(xj |T j) is a constant function for each j ∈ N. Then the plan
((E(xj |Tj))j∈N,yN) is available to the grand coalition N.
13 In the ﬁrst main result (theorem 3.2.5), the existence of an equilibrium plan
(x∗N,y∗N), called an ex ante core plan, for which ∀ t : ∀ j : x∗j(t) ≥ 0 is asserted.50
Being an insurer is the only role that the headquarters plays in this game,
in addition to participating in the coalitional design of a plan as one of the
divisions. By this postulate, division j can receive the accounting proﬁt
according to the constant proﬁt imputation plan E(xj |Tj). This is justiﬁed
if the headquarters is risk-neutral. Moreover, this is an easy task for the
headquarters, because it does not have to know the true type of division j
(the need for insurance occurs only when E(xj | tj) is the same for all tj).
This postulate does not reduce the model to a static game. Indeed, while
the proﬁt imputation plan for the grand coalition, (E(xj |Tj))j∈N, stated in
the postulate has a static ﬂavor as a constant function, it is made possible
by non-constant net output function yN, and the latter is subject to the
information-revelation process.
Let HN be the set of all plans (xN,yN) for the grand coalition N such
that xN is a constant function, and such that there exists x N : T → R|N|
for which (x N,yN) ∈ F  N and E(x j |Tj)=xj for every j ∈ N. Notice that





ˆ F S, if S  = N,
ˆ F N ∪ HN, if S = N.
The set ˆ F ∗S is the set of all technologically attainable or insurable plans of
coalition S that are consistent with the three postulates, the information-
revelation process, the Bayesian incentive compatibility, and the headquar-
ters’ insurability. Plan (xS,yS) is a candidate for coalition S’s agreement, iﬀ
(xS,yS) ∈ ˆ F ∗S.
An ex ante core plan of a proﬁt-center game with incomplete informa-
tion D is a Bayesian incentive-compatible strong equilibrium: It is a plan
(x∗N,y∗N) of the grand coalition N such that (i) (x∗N,y∗N) ∈ ˆ F ∗N, and (ii)
it is not true that there exist S ∈Nand (xS,yS) ∈ ˆ F ∗S such that Exj >E x ∗j
for all j ∈ S. A core plan (x∗N,y∗N) is called full-information revealing,i f
for every j ∈ N, y
∗j
1 is 1-1 on T j. In this case, the updated algebra ˆ T j(y∗N
1 )
becomes the full communication system 2T.
THEOREM 3.2.5 (Ichiishi and Radner, 1999) Let D be a proﬁt-center
game with incomplete information which satisﬁes the three postulates: the
information-revelation process, the Bayesian incentive compatibility, and the51
headquarters’ insurability. Assume for each j,
(i) the production set Y j is closed in Rk·#T;
(ii) 0 ∈ Y j;
(iii) Y j − R
k·#T
+ ⊂ Y j;
(iv) for each yj
n ∈ Rkn·#T, the production possibility set {yj
m ∈ Rkm·#T |
(yj
m,yj
n) ∈ Yj} is bounded from above;
(v) K1n  = ∅, and for each j, the function r
j
1 is T j-measurable, that is, it
depends only upon tj;
(vi) the function r
j
1 is 1-1 on T j;
(vii) rj(t) ≥ 0, for all t ∈ T;
(viii) the ex ante probability π is the product probability of πj, j ∈ N, where
πj is a probability on T j.
Assume moreover that the production set Y j is convex for each j ∈ N. Then
there exists a full-information revealing ex ante core plan of the game.
Conditions (i)-(iv) in theorem 3.2.5 are the basic assumptions on the pro-
duction sets. In particular, (ii) says that zero production activity is possible;
(iii) means free disposal; and (iv) means the impossibility of the Land of
Cockaigne.
Conditions (v)-(vii) are the basic assumptions on the resource function of
each division. In particular, (v) says that there are nonmarketed commodities
which are used or produced in the ﬁrst period, and each resource function
r
j
1 of these commodities depends only on j’s type; (vi) says that division j’s
technology is embodied in its nonmarketed resources of the ﬁrst period; and
(vii) says that all resources are nonnegative.
Before providing a sketch of the proof of theorem 3.2.5, we present a






1n), so vector yi
1n(ti) is a nonmarketed
commodity bundle used as inputs in the setup period, whose components are
measured by negative real numbers according to the usual sign convention
on inputs and outputs.
LEMMA 3.2.6 (Ichiishi and Radner, 1999) Suppose that for each i
there exists a function yi
1n : T i → Rk1n such that





































Sketch of the Proof of Theorem 3.2.5 Apply Scarf’s theorem for nonemp-
tyness of the core (see, e.g., Scarf (1973, theorem 8.3.6, p. 211)) to the
non-side-payment game deﬁned by
V (S): ={u ∈ R
N |∃(x
S,y
S) ∈ ˆ F
∗S : ∀ j ∈ S : uj ≤ Ex
j}.
¿From a core plan (xN,yN), we obtain another core plan (x∗N,y∗N) for which
total use and total supply of each commodity are equal in view of lemma 3.2.6.


























1 is assumed to be 1-1, y
∗j
1n has to be also 1-1. Therefore, plan
(x∗N,y∗N) is full-information revealing.
￿
Ichiishi and Radner (1999) established further existence results: (1) for
the case in which the total production set
 
j∈N Y j exhibits a speciﬁc instance
of increasing returns to scale, that is, a stronger version of Scarf’s (1986)
distributiveness condition; and (2) for the case in which there exists a speciﬁc
supplier-customer relationship among the divisions.
Ichiishi and Sertel (1998) continued study of the proﬁt-center game with
incomplete information. They studied the interim Bayesian incentive-compat-
ible core (deﬁnition 2.5.3) and welfare loss. Their analysis of the interim
Bayesian incentive-compatible core is facilitated by the following observa-
tion: Due to the weak Bayesian incentive compatibility which is implied by
Bayesian incentive compatibility, a strategy bundle (x∗N,y∗N) ∈ ˆ F ∗N satisﬁes
∀ t
j,t













Thus, the interim core and the ex ante core coincide in this model.53
3.2.2 By choosing a contract
The next approach to information revelation borrows the idea from the
principal-agent theory that agreeing or refusing to sign a contract reveals
a private information. It applies to interim contracting in the private infor-
mation case. There is no deﬁnitive written work based on this idea, however,
and indeed it has a serious limitation if no other approaches are adopted
concurrently. We will see two examples ﬁrst in which a player’s intention to
sign a contract reveals his private information to the other players.
EXAMPLE 3.2.7 This example, attributed by Ichiishi and Sertel to an
anonymous referee of their paper Ichiishi and Sertel (1998), describes a situ-
ation in which coalition formation is more diﬃcult than is suggested by the
coalitional stability condition of the interim Bayesian incentive-compatible
strong equilibrium (deﬁnition 2.5.3). The essence of this example was ob-
served by Wilson (1978, example 1, p. 809) when he illustrated the phe-
nomenon of adverse selection which often violates opportunities for insur-
ance.
Assume that each choice set is the real numbers, Cj = R, and each utility
function is the projection onto Cj, uj(c,t)=cj. Suppose the grand coalition
is deliberating on the constant strategy bundle x:
∀ j ∈ N : ∀ t ∈ T : x
j(t)=1 .
Suppose also that subcoalition S := {1,2} ﬁnds the following strategy bundle
x S ∈ F S(x): Assume π(t)=
 
j∈N πj(tj). Assume also for each i ∈ S,













 i | H
i)=2> 1=E(x
i | H
i), for every i ∈ S,
so S can improve upon x using x S when the true type proﬁle is ¯ tS =( H1,H2).
However, player 1 knows that player 2 agrees to the joint strategy x S only54
when 2’s true type is H2, since
E(x




Then player 2’s agreement to x S reveals the information to player 1 that 2’s











Thus, strategy x S cannot serve as a “blocking” strategy against xS.
￿
EXAMPLE 3.2.8 This example, a variation of the previous example, de-
scribes a situation in which coalition formation is easier than is suggested
by the coalitional stability condition of the interim Bayesian incentive-
compatible strong equilibrium (deﬁnition 2.5.3). Assume again Cj = R,
uj(c,t)=cj, S := {1,2}, T i = {Hi,L i}, πi(Hi)=πi(Li)=1 /2 for each
i ∈ S. Suppose the grand coalition is deliberating on the constant strategy
bundle x:
∀ j ∈ N : ∀ t ∈ T : x
j(t)=1 .
Suppose also that coalition S ﬁnds the following strategy bundle x  S ∈ F S(x):
x
  1(t)=x
  2(t): =
 




  1 | H
1)=E(x
  1 | L





so S cannot improve upon x using x  S according to the traditional “blocking”
criterion. However, when the true type proﬁle is ¯ tS =( H1,H2), player 2
wants to agree to the joint strategy x  S. When this happens, player 1 infers
that 2’s true type is H2, so 1 also wants to agree to x  S. Thus, strategy x  S
serves as a “blocking” strategy against xS.
￿
The heart of these examples lie in the fact that players are comparing two
strategy bundles. In example 3.2.8, if the members of coalition S decide to
form their coalition and adopt strategy bundle x  S when the grand coalition
has been deliberating on strategy bundle x, it is because they received the
information that event {(H1,H2),(L1,H2)} has realized, and both players55
are better oﬀ with x  S than with x given this additional information. It is
important to keep in mind that this kind of information revelation occurs
within a “blocking” coalition. The scenario here (in which two strategy bun-
dles x  S and x are compared) does not address how the private information
is revealed only through the original strategy bundle x of the grand coali-
tion N. In particular, given a strong equilibrium strategy bundle (or a core
strategy bundle) x∗, this kind of information revelation does not occur, since
there are no “blocking” coalitions.
Notice that strategies x S and x  S in examples 3.2.7 and 3.2.8 are not
T j-measurable or Bayesian incentive-compatible. Ichiishi and Sertel (1998)
noted that in the proﬁt center game (example 2.2.3), information is not re-
vealed through coalition formation: For any strategy (xS,yS) ∈ ˆ F S, E(xi |
T i) is constant on T for every i ∈ S. Then a “blocking” strategy would have
to make every i ∈ S better oﬀ (in terms of the interim expected imputation)
for all possible type proﬁles. Thus, the fact that division i joins a partic-
ular coalition does not reveal any information to the other divisions of the
coalition.
3.2.3 By credible transmission of information during the contract
negotiation
This approach, taken by Yazar (2001), endogenously determines a commu-
nication system as a part of coalition’s strategy bundle during the ex ante
period of strategy negotiation. Recall her formulation of a strategy in the
Bayesian pure exchange economy (subsection 2.4.3) and her Bayesian in-
centive compatibility condition 2.4.7. Deﬁne for each coalition S the set of















∀ j ∈ S : zj is ∨i∈S Ci-measurable, and Cj ⊂Tj,
{zj,Cj}j∈S is Bayesian incentive-compatible,







A strategy bundle {z∗j,C∗j}j∈N of the grand coalition in Bayesian pure
exchange economy Epe is said to be in the EC-core (endogenous communi-
cation plan core), (i) if it is in ˆ F N, and (ii) if it is not true that there exist
S ∈Nand {zj,Cj}j∈S ∈ ˆ F S such that Euj(zj + ej) >E u j(z∗j + ej) for
every j ∈ S. The communication system {A∗j}j∈N, A∗j := T j ∨ (∨i∈NC∗i),
sustains as a result of credible talk at the contract negotiation.56
Yazar’s main result (theorem 3.2.10) follows immediately from her lemma
on nested structures:
LEMMA 3.2.9 (Yazar, 2001) For any coalition S ∈N , let {Cj}j∈S
and {C j}j∈S be two communication plan bundles, and let {zj}j∈S be a net
trade bundle. If C j ⊂C j for every j ∈ S and if {zj,C j}j∈S ∈ ˆ F S, then
{zj,Cj}j∈S ∈ ˆ F S.
THEOREM 3.2.10 (Yazar, 2001) Let {Cj}j∈N and {C j}j∈N be two com-
munication plan bundles, and let {zj}j∈N be a net trade bundle for the grand
coalition. If C j ⊂C j for every j ∈ N and if {zj,C j}j∈N is in the EC-core,
then {zj,Cj}j∈N is also in the EC-core.
In particular, if the EC-core is nonempty at all, then there exists a strat-
egy bundle in the EC-core which gives rise to the full communication system.
For the special case in which each utility function uj(·,t) is aﬃne linear
on the consumption set Rl
+, Yazar (2001) also established nonemptiness of
the EC-core by direct application of Scarf’s theorem for nonemptiness of the














∃{ zj,Cj}j∈S ∈ ˆ F S :
∀ t ∈ T :
 
j∈S zj(t)=0





For Vohra’s Bayesian incentive compatibility (condition 2.4.5) applied to
an arbitrary communication plan, the analogue of lemma 3.2.9 is trivially
true. We may, therefore, assume without loss of generality that coalition S
designs a strategy bundle {zj,T j}j∈S with the full communication plan.
3.3 Eﬃciency
There are substantial amount of works on normative solution concepts for
Bayesian cooperative games; for a survey, see, e.g., the introductory section
of Rosenm¨ uller (1992). In this subsection, we focus on a speciﬁc norma-
tive criterion, Pareto eﬃciency. Corresponding to the interim descriptive
solution concepts of the coarse core (deﬁnition 2.5.1) and the ﬁne core (deﬁ-
nition 2.5.2), Wilson (1978) proposed two interim eﬃciency criteria (deﬁni-
tions 3.3.1 and 3.3.2 below) within the framework of Bayesian pure exchange57
economy (example 2.2.1) and examined these properties for several numerical
examples. They can immediately extended to the Bayesian society.
DEFINITION 3.3.1 (Wilson, 1978) A commodity allocation plan x∗ of
Bayesian pure exchange economy Epe is said to be coarse eﬃcient,i f
(i) x∗ ∈ F N
T ; and
(ii) if it is not true that
∃ E ∈∧ j∈NT
j : ∃ x ∈ F
N
E :







As the coalitional stability condition for the coarse core, the above ef-
ﬁciency condition (ii) is weak in the present extreme case of asymmetric











it is weaker than ex ante eﬃciency.
DEFINITION 3.3.2 (Wilson, 1978) A commodity allocation plan x∗ of
Bayesian pure exchange economy Epe is said to be ﬁne eﬃcient,i f
(i) x∗ ∈ F N
T ; and
(ii) if it is not true that
∃ E ∈∨ j∈NT
j : ∃ x ∈ F
N
E :







Notice that Wilson’s ﬁne eﬃciency corresponds to the situation in which
the only available communication system is the full communication system.
The above criterion (ii) in the present extreme case of asymmetric informa-
tion amounts to the ex post eﬃciency criterion:
¬∃t ∈ T : ∃ c ∈ F
N





Hahn and Yannelis (1997) noted that many eﬃciency criteria can be
deﬁned (1) for diﬀerent timings of evaluation (ex ante, interim, ex post) and
(2) for diﬀerent availabilities of information (coarse, private, ﬁne). Among
the various criteria they presented, the following is noteworthy:58
DEFINITION 3.3.3 (Hahn and Yannelis, 1997) A commodity allo-
cation plan x∗ of Bayesian pure exchange economy Epe is said to be interim
private eﬃcient,i f
(i) x∗ ∈ F  N; and
(ii) if it is not true that
∃ t ∈ T : ∃ x
N ∈ F







It is widely known that the Bayesian incentive compatibility is a ma-
jor cause of ex post (Pareto-)ineﬃciency. Ichiishi and Sertel (1998) studied
the interim Bayesian incentive-compatible core (deﬁnition 2.5.3) of the proﬁt
center game with incomplete information (example 2.2.3) and showed the fol-
lowing by an example: Recall the two-interim-period framework, the setup
period and the manufacturing period. A full-information-revealing core plan
reveals the complete information by the end of the setup period (that is,
the manufacturing period becomes the ex post period). Players then real-
ize the welfare loss created in the setup period. There are two sources of
the loss, the information-revelation process and the Bayesian incentive com-
patibility. Ichiishi and Sertel (1998) introduced the new scenario that the
divisions are free to make a re-contract after the setup period, provided that
nobody will receive a lower utility level than was promised in the original con-
tract. Such re-contract can remove the ineﬃciency caused by the Bayesian
incentive compatibility. However, ex post ineﬃciency may still persist, be-
cause the divisions have made some of the choices at the time when each
had no information about the others’ types, that is, the loss caused by the
information-revelation process is irreversible.
3.4 Comparisons of several core concepts
We ﬁrst discuss comparison of the ﬁne core and the ex post core. Einy,
Moreno and Shotovitz (2000a) studied the Bayesian pure exchange economy
with a nonatomic space of consumers, an incomplete-information version of
Aumann’s (1964) seminal model, and established that a ﬁne core allocation
is an ex post core allocation.
Actually, their comparison result is straightforward in our ﬁnite setup
(example 2.2.1). We have already pointed out in subsection 2.5 that a ﬁne
core allocation x∗ of the Bayesian pure exchange economy Epe satisﬁes in59
particular,
¬∃S ∈N: ∃ t
S ∈ T











An ex post core allocation of economy Epe is deﬁned as a strategy bundle
x∗ ∈ F N
T such that
¬∃S ∈N: ∃ t ∈ T : ∃ c
S ∈ F
S





The former coalitional stability condition (for the ﬁne core) implies the
latter coalitional stability condition (for the ex post core), if π   0. Indeed,
suppose the contrary,
∃ S ∈N: ∃ t ∈ T : ∃ c
S ∈ F
S
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violating the coalitional stability condition for the ﬁne core. Thus, every ﬁne
core allocation of the Bayesian pure exchange economy is an ex post core
allocation.
How this proposition is modiﬁed if we impose the basic requirements
(measurability and Bayesian incentive compatibility) on the ﬁne core is still
an open question.60
Krasa and Shafer (2001) formulated incomplete information diﬀerently
from the present type-proﬁle framework (subsection 2.1), and deﬁned the
measurability requirement (c.f. subsection 2.3) and the Bayesian incentive
compatibility requirement (c.f. subsection 2.4) within their own framework.
They applied these requirements to the pure exchange economy in order
to deﬁne the private core and the Bayesian incentive-compatible core, re-
spectively. The incentive-compatible core may not satisfy the measurability
condition here. According to their formulation, the concept of convergence of
incomplete information to the complete information is well-deﬁned. Roughly
stated, their results are that in general the private core allocations does not
converge to any complete information core allocation as the incomplete infor-
mation converges to the complete information, but that almost all complete
information core allocations can be the limit of incentive-compatible core allo-
cations as the incomplete information converges to the complete information.
While their formulation cannot encompass the one-shot model of the present
paper (subsection 2.1), their results nevertheless provide insights into the
nature of the two requirements.
We present Krasa and Shafer’s model now. Let N be a ﬁnite set of
consumers, and let Ω be a state space. In the case of the Bayesian pure
exchange economy (example 2.2.1), the state space is given as Ω =
 
j∈N T j,
but in the Krasa-Shafer formulation, the space Ω is arbitrarily given. In-
complete information is deﬁned as a noisy signal: when state ω ∈ Ωi s
realized, player j receives the wrong information with a positive probability
that state ω  ∈ Ω \{ ω} has occurred. Let Φj := Ω, player j’s signal space.
Let Φ :=
 
j∈N Φj, the signal bundle space. Incomplete information is de-
ﬁned as a probability π on Ω×Φ. In the private information case, consumer
j observes signal ω  ∈ Φj and infers that event E ⊂ Ω has occurred with
probability
π(E × Ω ×···×{ω }×···×Ω)
π(Ω × Ω ×···×{ω }×···×Ω)
.
Complete information is deﬁned as a probability ˆ π on Ω × Φ such that
ˆ π({(ω,ω,···,ω) ∈ Ω × Φ | ω ∈ Ω}) = 1. A sequence of incomplete in-
formation is said to converge to a complete information, if π → ˆ π. The
complete information ˆ π deﬁned in the Krasa-Shafer framework is diﬀerent
from the complete information deﬁned in the type-proﬁle framework of sub-
section 2.1; see remark 3.4.1 below.61
The consumption set of each consumer is the nonnegative orthant Rl
+
of the commodity space Rl. Player j’s preference relation is represented by
a state-dependent von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function, uj : Rl
+ ×
Ω → R. His initial endowment is a state-dependent commodity bundle,
ej :Ω→ Rl
+. The K-S pure exchange economy is thus given as a list of






Consumer j’s strategy is a (state, signal bundle)-contingent commodity
bundle, xj :Ω× Φ → Rl









Let ˆ π be a complete information. A complete information core allocation
of a K-S pure exchange economy (with ˆ π) is a strategy bundle {x∗j}j∈N such









and such that it is not improved upon by any coalition:
¬∃S ∈N: ∃ x















where the expectation is taken with respect to the complete information ˆ π.
The private information structure T j of player j is the algebra on Ω×Φ,
generated by the sets,




Ω × Ω ×···×{ω}×···×Ω,ω ∈ Φ
j.
The private information structure T j deﬁned in the Krasa-Shafer framework
is diﬀerent from the private information structure deﬁned in the type-proﬁle
framework of subsection 2.1; see remark 3.4.1 below.
Given a (general) incomplete information π,aprivate core allocation of
a K-S pure exchange economy (with π) is deﬁned exactly as the above com-
plete information core allocation, except that all strategies, x∗j in the grand
coalition and xj in the blocking coalition, are T j-measurable.62
Consumer j’s strategy xj :Ω× Φ → Rl
+ is called Bayesian incentive-
compatible, if misrepresentation of his signal does not increase his ex ante
expected utility:,
∀ φ = {φ
i}i∈N ∈ Φ:∀ φ



















Given a (general) incomplete information π,aBayesian incentive-compat-
ible core allocation of a K-S pure exchange economy (with π) is deﬁned
exactly as the above complete information core allocation, except that all
strategies, x∗j in the grand coalition and xj in the blocking coalition, are
Bayesian incentive-compatible. It does not have to be T j-measurable.
REMARK 3.4.1 The complete information ˆ π and the private information
structure T j deﬁned in the Krasa-Shafer framework are diﬀerent from those
deﬁned in the type-proﬁle framework of subsection 2.1. According to the
latter deﬁnition of the complete information, the ex ante stage and the ex
post stage are identical, that is, #Ω = 1, or almost equivalently (in the case
#Ω is arbitrary), there exists ω ∈ Ω which every player knows will occur
surely (ˆ π(ω,ω,···,ω) = 1).
In the Krasa-Shafer framework, let π(·|φj) be the conditional probability
of π given φj ∈ Φj. Corresponding to the assumption of subsection 2.1 that
the ex ante probability on the type-proﬁle space is strictly positive, assume
here that the support of π(·|φj) is of the form,
supp π(·|φ
j)=E × Ω ×···×Ω.
Then the algebra on Ω × Φ generated by the sets,
{(ω,φ) ∈ Ω × Φ | (ω,φ
N\{j}) ∈ supp π(·|¯ φ
j),φ




is the private information structure deﬁned in subsection 2.1.
We demonstrate by an example how Krasa and Shafer’s framework cannot
encompass our model of Bayesian pure exchange economy (example 2.2.1).
Consider the Bayesian pure exchange economy Epe with two consumers (N =63
{1,2}), such that consumer 1 has one type and consumer 2 has two types
(T 1 = {t1}, T 2 = {t2
a,t 2








The objective ex ante probability on T is given by the probability which
assigns density p on {a}, and (1 − p)o n{b}.
Krasa and Shafer’s state space Ω is the type-proﬁle space T in the present
model Epe, so the complete information π (ex ante probability on Ω × Φ: =
T × T × T) is given by the condition,
π({(a,a,a),(b,b,b)})=1 .
On the other hand, the incomplete information πp on Ω×Φ derived from the





             
             
p2 if (ω,φ1,φ 2)=( a,a,a),
0i f ( ω,φ1,φ 2)=( a,a,b),
p(1 − p)i f( ω,φ1,φ 2)=( a,b,a),
0i f ( ω,φ1,φ 2)=( a,b,b),
0i f ( ω,φ1,φ 2)=( b,a,a),
(1 − p)p if (ω,φ1,φ 2)=( b,a,b),
0i f ( ω,φ1,φ 2)=( b,b,a),
(1 − p)2 if (ω,φ1,φ 2)=( b,b,b),
because player 1 has probability (p,1 − p)o nT at the interim stage, which
is uncorrelated with the ex ante probability (p,1 − p) on the state space T,
and player 2 has the complete information at the interim stage. Thus, as
long as the complete information π assigns a strictly positive probability on
every point (that is, π(ω,ω,ω) > 0 for each ω ∈ Ω), πp cannot converge to π
no matter how p behaves.
When p → 1, the incomplete information πp does converge to the speciﬁc
complete information ˆ π, given by ˆ π(a,a,a) = 1. The limit probability ˆ π says
that the ex ante state is identical to the ex post state, i.e., the sure occurrence
of a ∈ Ω; this situation is much stronger than the Krasa-Shafer deﬁnition of
complete information.
￿64
3.5 Pure exchange economy











where set Cj is consumer j’s consumption set. These works are mostly on
the existence of a core allocation, and on the core convergence theorem. We
assume that either each consumption set is the nonnegative orthant Rl
+ of
the commodity space, or it is a nonempty and compact subset of Rl (the
latter assumption can be made without loss of generality).
3.5.1 Existence
We have already reviewed some existence results for the Bayesian pure ex-
change economy in subsection 3.1, since they can straightforwardly be ex-
tended to the general model of Bayesian society as strong equilibrium exis-
tence theorems. We present here further works on the existence of a core
allocation: Vohra’s (1999) Bayesian incentive-compatible coarse core allo-
cation existence theorem for the mediator-base approach, two immediate
consequences of Ichiishi and Idzik’s (1996) general existence result on an ex
ante solution (theorem 3.1.2), and an ex ante Bayesian incentive-compatible
core allocation existence theorem for the private information case. It is un-
likely that Vohra’s (1999) result and the ex ante existence theorem for the
private information case can be extended beyond the Bayesian pure exchange
economy.
Vohra (1999, proposition 3.1) provided a suﬃcient condition for the exis-
tence of a Bayesian incentive-compatible coarse core allocation of the Bayesian
pure exchange economy Epe for the mediator-based approach. In his frame-
work, use of a net trade plan zj : T → Rl as player j’s strategy (instead of
a demand plan t  → zj(t)+ej(tj)) is crucial. Also crucial is his assumption
that j’s ex ante probability πj takes value 0 on some type proﬁles, and the
support of πi and the support of πj are the same for all i,j ∈ N. Denote
by T ∗ the support of πj; T ∗ := {t ∈ T | πj(t) > 0}. Information is called
non-exclusive, if unilateral deception can be detected, that is, if
∀ t ∈ T







LEMMA 3.5.1 (Vohra 1999) Let Epe be the Bayesian pure exchange
economy, in which information is non-exclusive and each consumer j’s strat-
egy is his net trade plan. Let z : T → Rl·#N be attainable net trade plans
({zj + ej}j∈N ∈ F N
T ) such that Euj(zj + ej | tj) ≥ Euj(ej | tj) for every
j ∈ N and tj ∈ T j. Then there exists an attainable and Bayesian incentive-
compatible net trade plans ˆ z : T → Rl·#N such that z and ˆ z give rise to the
same interim expected utility allocation,
















zj(t)i f t ∈ T ∗,
0 otherwise.
Clearly, ˆ z is attainable, and gives rise to the same interim expected utility
allocation as z. We only need to check the Bayesian incentive compatibility.























































Proof of Vohra’s existence theorem is completed by combining Wilson’s
existence theorem and lemma 3.5.1 as follows: Let z be a coarse core alloca-
tion, whose existence is asserted by Wilson. In the light of lemma 3.5.1, there
exists an attainable, Bayesian incentive-compatible allocation ˆ z which gives
rise to the same interim expected utility allocation as z. No coalition can im-
prove upon z using its attainable allocation, Bayesian incentive-compatible66
or not. So no coalition can improve upon ˆ z using its Bayesian incentive-
compatible, attainable allocation.
Non-exclusive information is illustrated in ﬁgure 1: the Vohra box dia-






























indicated by the shaded area in ﬁgure 1. Notice that for each type proﬁle
t ∈ T ∗, there exists one player who knows the precise realization of t. Infor-
mation is obtained not only through the private information structure but
also through the marginal probability.
Vohra’s (1999) main result is an example of a Bayesian pure exchange
economy for the mediator-based approach whose Bayesian incentive-compatible
coarse core is empty (example 3.2, pp. 136-137). Needless to say, he con-
structs nonlinear utility functions.
The ﬁrst consequence of Ichiishi and Idzik (1996) is an obvious special
case: If each utility function uj(·,t) of economy Epe is aﬃne linear on Cj,
then there exists a Bayesian incentive-compatible core allocation.
The second consequence, which is also straightforward, is on economy Epe
in which everybody takes a mixed strategy (or rather, type-proﬁle dependent
mixed choices) and the coalitional attainability is deﬁned as the expected
feasiblity. Consumer j’s choice set is now the set M(Cj) of all probabilities on
the compact consumption set Cj. His strategy is a function µj : T →M (Cj),
t  → µj[t](·); denote by Xj the set of all such functions. His preference relation










Coalition S’s feasible strategy bundle is a T S-measurable member of XS
such that for each t the expected total demand is less than or equal to the
total supply. Coalition S’s feasible strategy correspondence is the constant











































































































Figure 1: The Vohra box diagram68










COROLLARY 3.5.2 Let Epe be a Bayesian pure exchange economy, in
which each consumption set Cj is a nonempty and compact subset of the
commodity space Rl and each von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function
uj(·,t) is continuous in Cj. Allow each consumer to take a mixed choice,
and deﬁne the coalitional attainability as the expected feasibility at each type
proﬁle. Then there exists a Bayesian incentive-compatible core allocation.
Proof We only have to verify that conditions (i)-(vi) of theorem 3.1.2
are all satisﬁed in the associate Bayesian society.
(i) The choice set M(Cj) endowed with the weak∗ topology is compact,
convex, and metrizable.
(ii) Clearly, for any j and any t, Uj(·,t) is linear aﬃne and continuous in
(M(Cj), weak∗ topology).
(iv) and (vi) Correspondence t  → F S, being a constant correspondence,
is both upper semicontinuous and lower semicontinuous. Set F S is clearly
nonempty, closed and convex.
(v) Let B be a balanced family of subsets of N with associated bal-
ancing coeﬃcients {λS}S∈B. Choose any {µS,j}j∈S ∈ F S and deﬁne νj :=
 










































So ν ∈ F N.
￿
We have reviewed that aﬃne linearity of j’s utility function on Cj plays
an essential role in establishing the existence of a Bayesian incentive com-
patible core allocation in the private information case (see theorem 3.1.2 and69
the sketch of its proof). This point is valid speciﬁcally in the Bayesian pure
exchange economy when each consumer chooses a demand plan as his strat-
egy. However, the story is diﬀerent in the situation in which each consumer
chooses a net trade plan as his strategy; see Forges, Minelli and Vohra (2000,
proposition 1) for the following theorem.
THEOREM 3.5.3 Let Epe be a Bayesian pure exchange economy, in which
each consumption set Cj is the nonnegative orthant Rl
+ of the commodity
space, and each von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function uj(·,t) is con-
cave, weakly monotone and continuous in Cj. Suppose that each consumer
chooses a net trade plan as a strategy. Then there exists a Bayesian incentive-
compatible core allocation.
Proof Deﬁne a non-side-payment game V : N→RN by
V (S): =

   









   
∃ zS : T → Rl·#S :
∀ j ∈ S : zj is T j-measurable,
∀ t ∈ T : zj(tj)+ej(tj) ∈ Rl
+,
 
j∈S zj(tj) ≤ 0,
∀ j ∈ S : uj ≤ Euj(zj + ej)

   
   
.
The sets V (S) are nonempty; indeed, the no-trade strategy bundle, zS(t) ≡ 0,
is always feasible, so gives rise to a member of V (S). By direct application of
Scarf’s theorem for nonemptiness of the core (see, e.g., Scarf (1973, theorem
8.3.6, p. 211)), the core of this game V is nonempty. Let z† be a net trade
plan bundle which gives rise to a member of the core. By lemma 6.3 of Ichiishi
and Radner (1999), re-produced in this paper as lemma 3.2.6, there exists a
net trade plan bundle z∗ such that each z∗j is T j-measurable, z†j ≤ z∗j, and
 
j∈N z∗j(tj)=0, for all t ∈ T. By weak monotonicity of uj(·,t), the bundle
z∗ gives rise to a member of the core of V . By proposition 6.10 of Hahn and
Yannelis (1997), re-produced in this paper as proposition 2.4.3, each strategy
z∗j is Bayesian incentive-compatible.
￿
REMARK 3.5.4 Forges and Minelli (2001) took the mediator-based ap-
proach, and constructed another kind of Bayesian pure exchange economy
with probabilistic choices. Let Epe be the deterministic Bayesian pure ex-
change economy (example 2.2.1). For each type proﬁle t, let CS
0(t) be the

























and denote by M(CS
0(t)) the set of all probabilities on CS
0(t). An element of
M(CS
0(t)) is not mixed choices, but a correlated choice. The product proba-
bility of mixed strategies is a correlated strategy, but in general a correlated
strategy cannot be expressed as the product probability of mixed strategies.
A coalitional feasible strategy is deﬁned as a selection µS : t  → µS[t](·) of the
correspondence, t  →M (CS
0(t)). Given coalitional strategy µS, consumer j’s
utility at the true type proﬁle ¯ t is
U
j(µ






In this correlated choice framework, individuals cannot singly choose his
probability on commodity bundles. His “action” is deﬁned as a report of his
type. If consumer j misrepresent his type as ˜ tj, assuming that everybody













A coalitional feasible strategy µS is called Bayesian incentive-compatible, if
nobody beneﬁts from misrepresenting his own type, that is,









Consumer j’s ex ante expected utility of coalitional feasible strategy µS is
given as EUj(µS): =
 
t Uj(µS[t],t)π(t), and from this we can deﬁne the ex
ante Bayesian incentive-compatible core.
Forges and Minelli (2001) established in this framework that if l =# N,
each utility function uj(·,t) is additively separable in Cj, ej is a constant
function, and e
j
h =0for all h  = j, then the ex ante Bayesian incentive-
compatible core is nonempty.
In the absence of Forges and Minelli’s restrictive assumptions, we expect
that the core may be empty. While their model does not naturally ﬁt in
our model of Bayesian society (deﬁnition 2.1.3) due to the use of correlated
choices, we can nevertheless imbed it in a particular Bayesian society: Re-





j}j∈S deﬁned on T
 
   
 
 
∀ j ∈ S : µj[t](·) ∈M (CS
0(t))
∀ i,j ∈ S : µi[t](·)=µj[t](·)
 
.71
When the members take a strategy bundle {µj}j∈S ∈ F S, everybody is choos-
ing the same strategy, and this common strategy has been called a coalitional
strategy, denoted by µS. We view that CS is a subset of CN (by setting the








constructed this way, assumptions (i)-(iv) and (vi) are satisﬁed (apart from
the T j-measurability requirement, whose omission does not change the the-
orem as pointed out in remark 3.1.3). But assumption (v) is violated, hence
the possibility of empty Bayesian incentive-compatible core. To see how (v)
is violated, let B be a balanced family of subsets of N, and let {λS}S∈B be
the associated balancing coeﬃcients. For each S ∈B , choose {µS}j∈S ∈ F S
and deﬁne {νj}j∈N by νj :=
 
S∈B:S j λSµS. Then νi  = νj for some i  = j,
so {νj}j∈N  ∈ F N. Indeed, Forges, Mertens and Vohra (2000) further spec-
iﬁed the model by introducing “money” and by assuming that each utility
function is linear in money, and provided an example which has no Bayesian
incentive-compatible core.
We point out two problems concerning the correlated-choice approach:
First, like the mixed-choice approach or more generally like any probabilistic
approach, it avoids the question of explaining deterministic choice. Even
when a player has decided on a probabilistic choice, a time will come when
he has to take a deﬁnite action. Usually in real life, he acts upon his own
will (which theory needs to explain), and does not leave his action up to the
outcome of throwing dice.
The second problem concerns speciﬁcally the correlated-choice approach.
The approach is applicable in general only to situations in which outsiders
to a coalition have no inﬂuence on the insiders, like the pure exchange econ-
omy (example 2.2.1) and the coalition production economy (example 2.2.2).
It is not applicable to situations in which a coalition’s feasible-strategy set
depends on an outsiders’ strategy bundle, or a player’s utility depends on
a choice bundle. To see this point, consider the simple no-externality case
addressed by theorem 3.1.2, re-formulated by introducing type-proﬁle depen-
dent correlated choices as strategies. Suppose the grand coalition is choosing
a strategy t  → µN[t](·), and coalition S is going to defect. In accordance
with the spirit of the strong equilibrium, the members of S passively take
the outsiders’ strategies as given. However, there is no way to identify the72
part of the strategy µN that the outsiders are responsible for, so the members
of S do not know which strategy of N \S they can passively take. One might
argue that S takes the marginal probability projN\S µN[t] ∈M (CN\S)a s
given. Yet there is no guarantee that the product of the two marginal prob-
abilities, projN\S µN[t] and projS µN[t], can recover the original probability,
µN[t]. The same problem occurs when a player’s utility depends fully on a
choice bundle. Thus, the approach fails to address intercoalitional problems
in which several coalitions inﬂuence each other: the situations commonly
observed in the present-day economy with organizations.
Instead of Forges and Minelli’s (2001) correlated choices, we can use ran-
domized choices deﬁned as functions fj : P → Cj for some probability space
(P,P,p). From a randomized choice bundle fS := {fj}j∈S, we derive a corre-
lated choice as its distribution p◦(fS)−1. An individual choice is re-deﬁned as
this randomized choice. This model can address the general case with exter-
nalities (although the ﬁrst problem about the very moment of deﬁnite action
still remains). We expect that an ex ante Bayesian incentive-compatible core
allocation existence theorem can be established for a Bayesian pure exchange
economy with randomized choices in the same way as theorem 3.1.2.
￿
3.5.2 Core convergence/equivalence theorems
We turn to a bulk of works on the Edgeworth conjecture (the core convergence
theorem or the core equivalence theorem) for the Bayesian pure exchange
economy. In the course of studying this issue, various competitive equilib-
rium concepts have been invoked or newly proposed; some suﬀer from con-
ceptual diﬃculties. We believe, however, that a core convergence/equivalence
result is meaningful only if it approximates/characterizes a competitive equi-
librium which is deﬁned sensibly enough so that one expects to realize in the
competitive market.
We have pointed out that Einy, Moreno and Shotovitz (2000a) estab-
lished within the framework of a nonatomic space of consumers that a ﬁne
core allocation is an ex post core allocation. Notice that the ex post stage is
essentially the complete information stage. They invoked Aumann’s (1964)
equivalence theorem for the pure exchange economy with complete informa-
tion, and asserted as a corollary that a ﬁne core allocation of the Bayesian
pure exchange economy with a nonatomic measure space of consumers is an
ex post competitive allocation.73
Forges, Heifetz and Minelli (2001) studied the Bayesian pure exchange
economy Epe, in which each initial endowment is a constant function, T →
Rl,t → ej, and in which everybody j in coalition S chooses a mixed strategy
(or rather, type-proﬁle dependent mixed choices) µj : T S →M (Cj), and the


















that is, the market clearance on the average across type proﬁles as well as
across pure choices (compare with the attainability deﬁnition in corollary
3.5.2 as the expected feasibility at each type proﬁle). Notice that the ex
ante expected feasibility does not guarantee the expected feasibility at the
interim time of strategy execution. They took the mediator-based approach,


































Denote by F ic,S the set of all strategy bundles of coalition S that satisfy the
ex ante expected feasibility and the Bayesian incentive compatibility. Set for




Forges, Heifetz and Minelli deﬁned an ex ante core allocation as a strategy




and (ii) it is not weakly improved upon by any coalition,
¬∃S ∈N: ∃{ µ
j}j∈S ∈ F










They deﬁned an ex ante competitive equilibrium as a pair of a price vector
p∗ ∈ Rl
+ and an attainable mixed-consumption plan bundle (strategy bundle)74
{µ∗j}j∈N ∈ Fic, such that each mixed commodity bundle µ∗j satisﬁes the ex


















and is the best of those mixed commodity bundles satisfying the ex ante
expected budget constraint, that is, for any Bayesian incentive compatible


















Applying the standard argument, Forges, Heifetz and Minelli established
that there exists an ex ante competitive equilibrium, and each ex ante com-
petitive allocation is an ex ante core allocation.
Then they considered the replica economies ` al aDebreu and Scarf (1963),
in which the type proﬁle space in the q-fold replicated economy is the q-
fold product of space T and the ex ante probability is the q-fold product
probability of π. They pointed out by an example that due to the dependence
of utility function uj on the type proﬁle t, the equal-treatment property is not
valid for an ex ante core allocation of the q-fold replicated economy. However,
they established that in the case of no externalities (uj = uj(cj,t j)), the q-
fold replicated economy has an ex ante core allocation with the equal treatment
property, and a consumption plan bundle with the equal treatment property
which is in the ex ante core of all q-fold replicated economies, q =1 ,2,···,
is an ex ante competitive allocation.
We have already pointed out the weakness of the attainability condition
in their deﬁnition of ex ante core allocation. More serious problems show
up in their mediator-based approach to the ex ante competitive allocation:
each mixed commodity bundle µj depends fully on T, so it is not clear how
a consumer can choose his mixed demand contingent upon the others’ pri-
vate information while being uncommunicative, and the ex ante notions of
attainability and budget constraint fail to guarantee the attainability and
the budget constraint at the interim time of actually executing these con-
sumption plans. More importantly, they have not provided a rationale for
imposing Bayesian incentive compatibility on the competitive allocations. A
competitive equilibrium is an outcome of a speciﬁc noncooperative behav-
ior guided only by a price vector established in the market, each consumer75
chooses his mixed commodity bundle by himself without coordinating with
other consumers, so there is no need for him to promise truthful execution of
his strategy to anybody. Thus, the sensible setup would be that an ex ante
core allocation satisﬁes both the private measurability condition (if we really
want to avoid the mediator) and the Bayesian incentive compatibility con-
dition 2.4.1, and an ex ante competitive allocation satisﬁes only the private
measurability condition. It is not clear if Forges, Heifetz and Minelli’s results
still remain to be true when the two conditions are discriminatorily applied as
suggested here. Finally, we repeat our position that a mixed-choice appoach
avoids the question of explaining deterministic choice.
While Forges, Heifetz and Minelli (2001) studied an ex ante Bayesian
incentive-compatible core allocation which may not be private measurable,
Einy, Moreno and Shitoviz (2001a) studied an ex ante private measurable
core allocation which may not be Bayesian incentive-compatible (a private
core allocation of deﬁnition 2.5.5), in the Bayesian pure exchange economy
with a nonatmic measure space of consumers (A,A,ν) and a general ﬁnite
state space (Ω,T ,π), #Ω < ∞, in which each consumer a has a private
information structure as a subalgebra T a of T .
The state ω-contingent claim for commodity h is a commodity traded in
the ex ante period which promises delivery of a unit of commodity h upon
realization of state ω in the interim period, and no delivery upon realization
of any other state. A claim allocation in A is a function x : A × Ω → Rl
+,
assigning to each consumer a the claim bundle x(a,·), which is attainable in
the economy,







It is said to satisfy the private measurability condition if function x(a,·)i sT a-
measurable, ν-a.e. (see condition 2.3.1 for the null communication system).
Einy, Moreno and Shitoviz considered Radner’s (1968) ex ante competitive
equilibrium of the state-contingent claim market deﬁned as a pair (p∗,x ∗)o f
price vector p∗ :Ω→ Rl
+ and measurable claim allocation x∗ : A× Ω → Rl
+
such that ν-a.e., consumer a’s claim bundle x∗(a,·) maximizes his ex ante































Applying the standard argument, Einy, Moreno and Shitoviz established
that an ex ante competitive equilibrium of the state-contingent market exists,
and the set of ex ante competitive allocations is identical to the set of private
information core allocations.
We will present Serrano, Vohra and Volij’s (forthcoming) negative result.
They considered Wilson’s (1978) coarse core allocations (deﬁnition 2.5.1) in
the Bayesian pure exchange economies replicated as in Debreu and Scarf
(1963); they did not impose private measurability (condition 2.3.1 for the
null communication system) or Bayesian incentive compatibility (condition
2.4.1 or 2.4.5).
As a competitive equilibrium concept for Epe which belongs to the coarse






h=1 ph(t)=1 } be the price domain. Consumer j’s con-
sumption plan is a plan xj : T → Rl
+. A consumption plan xj gives rise to the
interim expected utility given type ¯ tj, Euj(xj | ¯ tj): =
 
t∈T uj(xj(t),t)π(t |
¯ tj). An allocation is a consumption plan bundle x such that the total demand
is equal to the total supply at every type proﬁle,









A constrained market equilibrium is a pair (p∗,x ∗) of price vector p∗ and
allocation x∗ such that for each consumer j and each information ¯ tj, x∗j
maximizes his conditional expected utility given ¯ tj subject to the budget
constraint given ¯ tj:
Maximize Eu
j(x




















Apart from failing to satisfy the measurability requirement, it diﬀers from
Radner’s (1968) ex ante competitive equilibrium of the state-contingent claim
market in that it accommodates #T j constrained maximization problems
that each consumer j possibly faces at the interim period. It raises the
following serious conceptual questions: If it is intended to be an interim
equilibrium concept, player j, acting alone in the market in which everybody
is anonymous, and knowing that his true type is ¯ tj, does not bother acting
rationally in the unrealized event E := {t ∈ T | tj  = ¯ tj}, yet his actions in E
inﬂuence the competitive equilibrium price vector p∗. If it is intended to be
an ex ante equilibrium concept, player j, not knowing his true type yet, tries
to maximize the sole objective function (the ex ante expected utility), but
there is no reason why he should segment the market into #T j submarkets.
This point is all the more problematic since the way to segment the market
diﬀers among diﬀerent anonymous consumers (commodity (h,ti,t j,t N\{i,j})
is traded with commodity (k,t i,t j,t N\{j}) in consumer j’s mind, yet they
cannot be traded in consumer i’s mind). We are, therefore, led back to Rad-
ner’s ex ante competitive equilibrium of the state-contingent claim market
as an appropriate ex ante equilibrium concept.
It is easy to check that a constrained market equilibrium allocation is a
coarse core allocation.
Serrano, Vohra and Volij then constructed an example to assert that
the Debreu-Scarf type core convergence theorem is not true for the coarse
core: The coarse core in a replica of size 2 of this example contains an
allocation which does not satisfy the equal treatment property. There exists
an allocation in this example whose m-replica is in the coarse core of the m-
replicated economy for all m, yet it cannot be a constrained market equilibrium
allocation.
Einy, Moreno and Shitovitz (2001b) looked at two notions of the bargain-
ing set of a Bayesian pure exchange economy with a nonatomic measure space
of consumers, and established an equivalence result and a non-equivalence
result, respectively, with respect to Radner’s ex ante competitive allocations
of the state-contingent market.
3.6 Other viewpoints
So far we have looked at analyses of situations where several players form
a coalition within which to communicate each other and coordinate their78
strategy choice. Each member of a coalition knows the membership of his
coalition, so he knows whom to deal with. In this subsection, however, we
will brieﬂy present two models that are based on another view on coalition
formation; speciﬁcally they describe situations in which coalitional member-
ship is anonymous.
Let (A,A,ν) be a probability space of players. Demange and Guesnerie
(2001) postulated that there exists a ﬁnite state space Ω; each player a’s type
is described by a member ¯ ω(a) of Ω. The proﬁle of the economy, ¯ ω : A → Ω,
is not known, but its distribution ¯ π := ν ◦ (¯ ω)
−1 is public knowledge as
the ex ante objective probability on the types, and is identiﬁed with the
grand coalition A since the players are anonymous. Let ¯ ω|S : S → Ω be the
restriction of ¯ ω to coalition S ∈A . Associated with each coalition S is the
measure on Ω, ¯ πS := ν ◦(¯ ω|S)
−1, representing its size ¯ πS(Ω) and distribution
of types ¯ πS(·). Deﬁne, therefore, the space of type distributions,
Π: ={π :2
Ω → R+ | π is additive, π(Ω) ≤ 1}.
The interim stage is deﬁned as the period in which each player a knows his
type ¯ ω(a) as his private information, as well as the public information ¯ π.
Denote by C the outcome space. The preference relation of the players
of type ω is represented by a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function,
u(·,ω):C → R.
Demange and Guesnerie’s main concern was a mechanism design for the
grand coalition. A plan associates with each type ω an outcome realized for
ω. Denote by F π the set of all feasible plans for type distributions π, a priori
given to the model. A mechanism is a function f :Ω× Π → C. There
are several scenarios for how a mechanism works; the following is a typical
one. An underwriter of a mechanism (e.g., the government, or an insurer,
or a mediator) designs mechanism f and announces it in public. He then
receives players’ conﬁdential responses about their private types, and forms
the distribution of the reported types π. The player who reported type ω will
then receive outcome f(ω,π). The Demange-Guesnerie mechanism can be
called an anonymous mechanism, in that the outcome for this player is not
determined by the exact identities of all respondents or the exact reported
type of each respondent, but merely by the reported-type distribution in
addition to his own report.
The grand coalition has the observable size π(Ω) = 1, so deﬁne Π(1) :=79
{π ∈ Π | π(Ω) = 1}. Mechanism f is feasible for A,i f
∀ π ∈ Π(1) : f(·,π) ∈ F
π.
It is called incentive-compatible for A,i f
∀ ω,ω
  ∈ Ω:∀ π ∈ Π(1) : u(f(ω,π),ω) ≥ u(f(ω
 ,π),ω).
Demange and Guesnerie proposed several coalitional stability concepts
for an incentive-compatible, feasible mechanism f for A, and deﬁned the
associated core concepts. The basic scenario for the blocking behavior goes
as follows: An underwriter for a blocking coalition S announces in public
a new mechanism, and those players who are made better oﬀ with the new
mechanism (compared with the standing mechanism f for A) respond by
conﬁdentially reporting his type to the underwriter, and form the blocking
coalition S.
Given the type-distribution π of the respondents, the size s = π(Ω) ∈
[0,1] of the respondents is observable to the underwriter, so deﬁne
Π(s): ={π | π(Ω) = s}.
Also observable is the support supp π ⊂ Ω of the reported type-distribution.
One stability concept assumes the situation in which each member of a
blocking coalition S exactly knows its distribution ¯ πS. Let s be the size of
S, s := ¯ πS(Ω). Coalition S statistically blocks mechanism f for the grand
coalition, if there is a mechanism g that is feasible,




  ∈ Ω:∀ π ∈ Π(s):u(g(ω,π),ω) ≥ u(g(ω
 ,π),ω),
such that it improves upon f,
∀ ω ∈ supp ¯ π
S : u(g(ω,¯ π
S),ω) >u (f(ω,¯ π),ω).
The statistical core is the set of incentive-compatible, feasible mechanisms
for A that are not statistically blocked.80
Another stability concept addresses the situation in which the type-distri-
bution of a blocking coalition is not known, but the blocking mechanism
provides self-selection criterion to reveal it. Formulation of this self-selection
criterion is the original conceptual contribution that Demange and Gues-
nerie’s present paper and Hara’s paper (to be introduced in the latter half of
this subsection) have made to the core analysis.
Notice that u∗(ω): =u(f(ω,¯ π),ω) is the status quo reservation level,
given a mechanism f for the grand coalition A. The standing mechanism
f is u∗-beliefs blocked, if there exists Ω  ⊂ Ω and an incentive-compatible
and feasible mechanism g for coalition S := (¯ ω)
−1 (Ω ) (the set of all players
whose type is in Ω ) such that
∀ ω ∈ Ω
  : u(g(ω,¯ π
S),ω) >u (f(ω,¯ π),ω), and
∀ ω  ∈ Ω
  : u(g(ω,¯ π
S),ω) ≤ u
∗(ω).
The ﬁrst set of inequalities says that the players in the blocking coalition S
improve upon the standing outcomes. The second set of weak inequalities is
the self-selection criterion: nobody outside coalition S has the incentive to
join the blocking coalition. By announcing this mechanism g, the underwriter
can form exactly the blocking coalition S. The u∗-beliefs-based core is the
set of incentive-compatible, feasible mechanisms for A that are not u∗-beliefs
blocked.
Hara (2001) recently proposed a new core concept for the static pure ex-
change economy Epe := {Rl
+,u(a,·),e(a)}a∈A with a nonatomic probability
space of consumers (A,A,ν); here the type proﬁle space is a singleton, so
notation for a type will be suppressed, and consumer a’s preference relation
is represented by a utility function of his consumption, u(a,·):Rl
+ → R.
Hara motivates his new core concept with the imaginary environment in
which consumers have gathered in a marketplace, being aware of the sta-
tistical distribution of the others’ characteristics, so each consumer knows
that somewhere in the marketplace there is another consumer he can engage
with in a mutually beneﬁcial exchange but he cannot locate such a trading
partner. In this environment, he can perhaps post a notice for the entire
crowd of consumers to solicit such and such a unit of good A in exchange
for such and such a unit of another good B. A coalition can then be formed
with whoever comes forward to enter into this trade. (This scenario is also
applicable to Demange and Guesnerie’s (2001) model.)81


















Allocation f ∈ F S is called envy-free, if there exists S  ∈A , S  ⊂ S and
ν(S )=ν(S), such that
(∀a,b ∈ S
  : e(a)+( f(b) − e(b)) ∈ R
l
+):
u(a,f(a)) ≥ u(a,e(a)+( f(b) − e(b))).
Let f ∈ F A be a standing envy-free allocation in the grand coalition. Each
consumer a’s status quo reservation level is then given as u∗(a): =u(a,f(a)).
The standing allocation f is blocked, if there exist a coalition S with a positive
measure (S ∈A , ν(S) > 0) and its envy-free allocation g ∈ F S, such that
coalition S improves upon f via g, that is, there exists S  ∈A , S  ⊂ S and
ν(S ) > 0, for which
u(a,g(a)) ≥ u(a,f(a)),ν -a.e. in S,
u(a,g(a)) >u (a,f(a)),ν -a.e. in S
 ,
and such that allocation g satisﬁes the self-selection criterion vis-` a-vis f in
that no set of outsiders to S with a positive measure want to pretend that
they were members of S, that is,
∃ S
  ∈A: S
  ⊂ S, ν(S
 )=ν(S),
∃ T
  ∈A: T
  ⊂ A \ S, ν(T
 )=ν(A \ S),
(∀a ∈ T
  : ∀b ∈ S
  : e(a)+( g(b) − e(b)) ∈ R
l
+):
u(a,e(a)+( g(b) − e(b))) ≤ u
∗(a).
The anonymous core is the set of all envy-free allocations f ∈ F A that are
not blocked.
Hara (2001) established an equivalence theorem between the anonymous
core and the set of competitive allocations, and also a generic limit theorem
for anonymous core for the replica ﬁnite economies.82
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Appendix
This Appendix presents the deﬁnition of Bayesian incentive compatibility
for the two-interim-period model of Bayesian society which satisﬁes the
information-revelation process (subsection 3.2.1). It extends d’Aspremont
and G´ erard-Varet’s (1979) original deﬁnition (condition 2.4.1) to the present
context. It also incorporates Murat Sertel’s idea, pretend-but-perform princi-
ple, later developed by Koray and Sertel (see, e.g., Koray and Sertel, 1992).
According to this principle, players are allowed to pretend to have their cho-
sen types, but must thereafter perform so as not to belie them.
A pretension function of player j is a function σ : T j → T j, which says
that when his true type is tj, he acts (makes a choice) as though his type
were σ(tj). Given any algebra Bj on T j, denote by endo(T j,Bj) the set14 of
all functions that map each tj into the minimal set of Bj that contains tj.I f
every member of coalition S has information structure Bj about player j’s
type, then j can only choose a pretension function σ ∈ endo(T j,Bj).
In order to deﬁne the Bayesian incentive compatibility, one needs to clarify
ﬁrst which choice of player j is legal in the sense that the other members of
the coalition S cannot catch j’s false pretension about his true type. Suppose
the members of S are deliberating on whether or not to sign a contract xS ∈
F  S(¯ x). At the beginning of the ﬁrst interim period, player j’s information
structure is given as T j, and no other member has any part of this information
(that is, if i ∈ S \{ j}, then T i ∩Tj = {∅,T}). So, player j is not caught
in the ﬁrst month no matter which choice he makes from {x
j
1(tj) | tj ∈
T j}; that is, he can make choice according to any pretension function σ ∈
endo(T j,{∅,Tj}), so that when player j’s true type is tj, he makes the choice
x
j
1(σ(tj)). By acting according to the function x
j
1◦σ, player j having his true





1 ◦σ(tj)) has occurred. This information may be false, that is,
tj may not be a member of A, but the other members take it as j’s testimony
about himself and expect that j will act according to this information in the
second interim period, that is, j will have to make a choice from x
j
2(A)i n
the second month. Therefore, j’s pretension function in the second month
has to be of the form τ ◦ σ for some τ ∈ endo(T j,A(x
j
1)).
14 Let P be the partition of T j that consists of the minimal nonempty members of Bj.
Then, endo(T j,Bj): ={σ : T j → T j |∀P ∈P: σ(P) ⊂ P}.89
When j chooses such a pair of pretension functions, σ ∈ endo(T j,{∅,Tj})
and τ ∈ endo(T j,A(x
j
1)), the other members i ∈ S \{ j}, acting hon-
estly, would make choices (xi
1(ti),x i
2(σ(tj),t S\{j})), because xi
2 is ˆ T i(xS
1)-









The present concept of Bayesian incentive compatibility says that player
j cannot beneﬁt from any pair of pretension functions that are not caught.
Thus, the set of Bayesian incentive-compatible feasible strategy set ˆ F S(¯ x)
is deﬁned by: xS ∈ ˆ F S(¯ x), iﬀ xS ∈ F  S(¯ x), and for all j ∈ S, all σ ∈
endo(T j,{∅,Tj}), all τ ∈ endo(T j,A(x
j











1 ◦ σ, x
j










where id is the identity map on T S\{j}.